Larry Watts ureaza Craciun Fericit cititorilor Ziaristi Online si lui Richard Andrew Hall intr-un comentariu despre "turistii" sovietici - Ziaristi OnlineZiaristi Online

Larry Watts ureaza Craciun Fericit cititorilor Ziaristi Online si lui Richard Andrew Hall intr-un comentariu despre “turistii” sovietici

Dupa ce pe Grupul Facebook Revolutia Romana, intretinut de revolutionarul timisorean Marius Mioc, cercetatorul Richard Andrew Hall si-a exprimat indoiala cu privire la “turistii” sovietici prezenti in Romania in decembrie 1989, mentionati cu trimitere la mai multe documente si in cartea lui Larry Watts, Fereste-ma Doamne de prieteni, i-am adresat istoricului american o intrebare cu privire la existenta sau non-existenta agentilor sovietici in acele zile fierbinti. Desigur, trebuie subliniat  ca din numarul vechiculat, de circa 30.000 de persoane cu pasaport sovietic intrate in tara in acele zile, numarul agentilor speciali era, dupa parerea noastra, sub 10 la suta din aceasta cifra. Comentariile au fost declansate pe marginea unui interviu publicat de Karadeniz Press sub titlul Larry Watts: In 1989 Puterea a fost acaparată de vechii agenti KGB si GRU. Scotianul-american Larry Watts ne-a transmis un raspuns complex insotit de urarile de La Multi Ani! si Craciun Fericit! adresate tuturor cititorilor portalului Ziaristi Online, ceea ce, evident, va uram si noi din inima. Iata raspunsul:

Mr. Roncea,

In response to your question regarding Mr. Hall’s (Richard Andrew – nota Z.O.) assertion as to the allegedly false nature of my statement regarding Soviet “tourists,” I would note that my reference in the book is to Romanian concern over the extraordinary abundance of Soviet “tourists” who chose mid-December 1989 as the most propitious time to visit Romania. The approximate number of 30-35,000 has been repeatedly confirmed by various Senate hearings (for example, see the rest of the footnote to which Mr. Hall refers):

Text & Footnote in Larry L. Watts, With Friends Like These (2010), p. 16:

“It is suggestive that more than 25,000 of the 37,000 “extra” Soviet tourists that deemed Romania a desirable place to visit or transit in the two weeks prior to its revolution in December 1989 chose not to leave until almost a year later, in October 1990, after the Romanian government formally insisted on their departure.90”

[Larry L. Watts, With Friends Like These (2010), Footnote 90, p. 26. “Ceauşescu protested the sudden influx of Soviet ‘tourists’ to Moscow at the time, none of whom stayed in hotels. See e.g. Mircea Munteanu, New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania, e-Dossier no. 5, Washington D.C., Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, December 2001, pp. 3-11, CWIHP. The Romanian Senate’s investigation into the events of December 1989 disclosed the extraordinary jump in Soviet ‘tourists’ from 30,000 in 1988 to 67,000 in 1989 as recorded in customs and border statistics, as well as the unexplained delay in their departure. Mention of this glaring anomaly was qualified as unwarranted “conspiracy theory.” See e.g. Depostion of Petre Roman, Transcript no. 90/8.03.1994, Romanian Senate Archive, Bucharest, pp. 44-45. According to ex-Prime Minister Roman, 30,000 Russians ‘tourists’ remained in Romania for almost a year, until officially requested to leave in October 1990. Allegedly, Caraman’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) informed Roman about them only at that time. However, since at least March, Romanian TV had broadcast news stories of the Russian encampments.”]

Mr. Hall draws attention to Soviet professions of lack of information, which I find plausible given the almost open conflict between Gorbachev and the KGB/Soviet Armed Forces at the time, as well as Amb. Bucur’s lack of “formal” instruction” made in Document 4.  However, I would also draw your attention to Documents 1, 2, 5 and 6 as underscoring Soviet displeasure that “hundreds of vehicles” from the USSR were not being allowed to cross into Romania, and Romanian suspicion – or rather conviction – that Soviet actions were part of a joint effort by the other Warsaw Pact states to “provoke or cause confusion” at least.

Document 1 — Telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest) 18 December 1989, 12:35 pm

… A. Beginning with the morning of 18 December of this year, Soviet citizens have begun to make telephonic inquiries to the Embassy from border crossings into Romania, implying that there are hundreds of vehicles which are not allowed to cross [border] into our country. [W]e anticipate that the Soviet government will ask for an explanation with regard to this decision taken. We ask that instructions be sent explaining the way we must deal with the situation if it arises. …

Document 2 — Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Bucharest) to all Embassies

19 December 1989

… We strongly reject any attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of S.R. Romania, a free and independent state. [We reject] any attempt to ignore the fundamental attributes of our national independence and sovereignty, any attempt at [harming] the security interests of our country, of violating its laws. The Romanian [government] will take strong actions against any such attempts, against any actions meant to provoke or cause confusion, [actions] initiated by reactionary circles, anti-Romanian circles, foreign special services and espionage organizations. …

Document 5 — Information Note from the Romanian Embassy in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 21 December 1989, 2:00 pm

… 2. Aboimov said that during the 19 December discussions between the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest and Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu, the latter expressed his disapproval with the official declarations made by Soviet officials concerning the events in Timisoara. He [Ceausescu] said that those [actions taking place in Timisoara] are the result of strategies developed beforehand by [member nations of] the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). [Ceausescu] suggested that certain officials in Bucharest told ambassadors from socialist countries that they have information with respect to the intention of the Soviet Union to intervene militarily in Romania. …

Document 6: From the diary of ABOIMOV I.P.  21 December 1989

Memorandum of conversation with the Ambassador of the SRR [Socialist Republic of Romania] in the USSR I. BUKUR  21 December 1989

… I told the Ambassador that during the meeting of N. Ceausescu with the Soviet charge d’affaires in the SRR on 20 December [the former] expressed surprise that Soviet representatives made declarations on the events in Timisoara. Besides, during the meeting it was asserted [by Ceausescu] that the Romanian side possesses information that the action in Timisoara was allegedly prepared and organized with the consent of countries [that are] members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Moreover, the actions against Romania were allegedly plotted within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. According to our information, officials in Bucharest in conversation with ambassadors of allied socialist states expressed an idea about some kind of action of interference into the internal affairs of the SRR allegedly under preparation in the Soviet Union. …

Two paragraphs after I made my original assertion regarding Ceausescu’s protests in this matter I made the point even more explicit, again referencing the documents posted on the Woodrow Wilson Center website as well as confirmation that such a wave a Soviet tourists did indeed choose to “tour” Romania in December from a knowledgeable and professional Soviet observer who was in Romania at the time. As I noted:

“In fact, the Romanian leader vigorously threatened countermeasures if the Soviet or Pact military forces should cross his country’s frontier and protested the thinly disguised military personnel crossing the border in automobile caravans masquerading as “tourists.”93”

[Footnote 93, p. 27: See e.g. Munteanu (2001), pp. 3-11, at CWIHP. Former Soviet intelligence assets continue to offer creative justification for the presence of these idiosyncratic “tourists,” who had to be formally invited to leave the country ten months after they began their ‘transit.’ For example, former Novovsti correspondent, Viacheslav Samoskin, in Romania at the time of the revolution, claimed that the “tourists” were part of an economic agreement with the USSR whereby Ceauşescu demanded a guaranteed 35,000 Soviet tourists a year “to buy Romanian goods,” and their visits just happened to be “concentrated at the end of the year.” Oana Balan, “Reporter rus sub gloanţe româneşti” [A Russian Reporter Under Romanian Bullets], Adevărul, 23 December 2009. Novosti Press Agency (APN) was well known as a front for Soviet ]intelligence, especially for the KGB’s Service A “active measures” personnel, which staffed an entire section. John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand, New York, Reader’s Digest Press, 1983, p. 446.]

I will leave it to your readers to judge whether my assertions in this regard are “false.” Of course, assessing the identity and intent of the “tourists” to any degree of certainty is a separate issue, which I purposefully avoided in this book.

Wishing you and your readers the very best for the holiday season,

Merry Christmas and Happy New Year

Larry L. Watts

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  1. RAH

    This was the exact comment in question (nowhere in his response does Mr. Watts show that Ceausescu specifically mentioned the Soviet tourists to Moscow at the time–hence why I claim the allegation is false)

    Watts claims (p. 26, note 90 With Friends Like These) “Ceausescu protested the sudden influx of Soviet ‘tourists’ to Moscow at the time, none of whom stayed in hotels” and invokes as proof the following This is false, as Document 4 (p. 8 of 11) from Romanian Ambassador Ion Bucur makes clear:

    2. The Soviet MFA received a series of complaints that the border between the Soviet Union and Romania has been closed for Soviet citizens, especially tourists. The Soviet government was not previously informed with regards to this development.

    3. …With regard to the issue of the tourists crossing the border in Romania, I said that I did not possess an official communication in this regard. I suggested that some temporary measures were adopted due to the need to limit access of certain groups of tourists [in the country]. [Those limitats sic were imposed] due to difficulties in assuring their access to hotel rooms and other related essential conditions. Those limitations do not apply to business travel or tourists transiting Romania.

  2. RAH

    The relevant portions of my research from 2002 and 2005: (Soviet tourists in transit from Yugoslavia were excluded from the ban on Soviet tourists…)

    Not surprisingly, the “tourist” myth originated with none other than Nicolae Ceausescu. This myth inevitably implies illegitimate and cynical “foreign intervention,” and Ceausescu used it to make sense of what were — probably genuinely, for him — the unimaginable and surreal antiregime protests which began in Timisoara on 15 December 1989.

    In an emergency meeting of the Romanian equivalent of the politburo (CPEX) on the afternoon of Sunday, 17 December 1989 — the afternoon on which regime forces were to open fire on the anti-Ceausescu demonstrators in Timisoara, killing scores and wounding hundreds — Ceausescu alleged that foreign interference and manipulation were behind the protests:

    “Everything that has happened and is happening in Germany, in Czechoslovakia, and in Bulgaria now, and in the past in Poland and Hungary, are things organized by the Soviet Union with American and Western help” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

    That Ceausescu saw “tourists” specifically playing a nefarious role in stimulating the Timisoara protests is made clear by his order at the close of this emergency meeting:

    “I have ordered that all tourist activity be interrupted at once. Not one more foreign tourist will be allowed in, because they have all turned into agents of espionage…. Not even those from the socialist countries will be allowed in, with the exception of [North] Korea, China, and Cuba. Because all the neighboring socialist countries are untrustworthy. Those sent from the neighboring socialist countries are sent as agents” (cited in Bunea, 1994, p. 34).

    Filip Teodorescu, who as head of the Securitate’s Counterespionage Directorate (Directorate III) had been dispatched to Timisoara and was later arrested for his role in the repression there, maintained in March 1990 at his trial that he detained “foreign agents” during the Timisoara events (“Romania libera,” 9 March 1990). In a book that appeared in 1992, Teodorescu described as follows the events in Timisoara on Monday, 18 December — that is, after the bloody regime repression of anti-Ceausescu demonstrators the night before:

    “There were few foreigners in the hotels, the majority of them having fled the town after lunch [on 17 December] when the clashes began to break out. The interested parties remained. Our attention is drawn to the unjustifiably large number of Soviet tourists, be they by bus or car. Not all of them stayed in hotels. They either had left their buses or stayed in their cars overnight. Border records indicate their points of entry as being through northern Transylvania. They all claimed they were in transit to Yugoslavia. The explanation was plausible, the Soviets being well-known for their shopping trips. Unfortunately, we did not have enough forces and the conditions did not allow us to monitor the activities of at least some of these ‘tourists’” (Teodorescu, 1992, p. 92).

    Teodorescu appears here to be attempting to account for the fact that on Monday, 18 December 1989 — presumably as a consequence of Ceausescu’s tirade the afternoon before about the malicious intent of virtually all “tourists” — Romania announced, in typically Orwellian fashion, that it would not accept any more tourists because of a “shortage of hotel rooms” and because “weather conditions are not suitable for tourism” (Belgrade Domestic Service, 20 December 1989). Ironically, the only ones exempted from this ban were “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” (!) (AFP, 19 December 1989).

    Part 3: Ruse


    As I have written before, if it was obvious before 18 December, as these Ceausescu regime officials claim, that “Soviet tourists” were involved in the events in Timisoara, then why was it precisely “Soviet travelers coming home from shopping trips to Yugoslavia” who were the only group declared exempt from the ban on “tourism” announced on that day (see AFP, 19 December 1989 as cited in Hall 2002b)? In fact, an Agent France-Presse correspondent reported that two Romanian border guards on the Yugoslav frontier curtly told him: “Go back home, only Russians can get through”!!! The few official documents from the December events that have made their way into the public domain show the Romanian Ambassador to Moscow, Ion Bucur, appealing to the Soviets to honor the Romanian news blackout on events in Timisoara, but never once mentioning—let alone objecting to—the presence or behavior of “Soviet tourists” in Romania during these chaotic days of crisis for the Ceausescu regime (CWHIP, “New Evidence on the 1989 Crisis in Romania,” 2001). It truly strains the imagination to believe that the Romanian authorities were so “frightened” of committing a diplomatic incident with the Soviets that they would allow Soviet agents to roam the country virtually unhindered, allowing them to go anywhere and do anything they wanted.

    traducere de catre Marius Mioc

  3. Dear Mr Hall,

    Mr Watts has just answered to your questions sending you straight to the documents you were interested in. I do not understand why you just don’t want to see them. I respect much of your work but still, you transformed some of your personal opinions in obsessions and facts misleading you from the scientific study and sending you straight to a dead end. I do not understand why for example you are ignoring the testimonials given by the actors and witnesses of the events to the special Inquiry Commission. You do must acknowledge that much of the history of ’89 events is based on oral history. I personally have some testimonials regarding the presences of special forces soviet agents in Bucharest – many from Moldova, with Afghanistan war on their shoulders – and maybe, for your sake, I will publish them. I can give you also my own striking view: on 22nd of December the walls around University and Rosetti squares were full with painted slogans – written by different hands – with “Jos CIA– USESCU!”. How many Romanians do you think didn’t know the name of their long term president and dictator Ceausescu and were writing down the phonetic version?

  4. gogu

    Ce rau imi pare ca aceasta limba nu mi-a placut niciodata , ca si rusa, ceea ce este o prostie dar asta e ! Poate traduceti, sa intelegem si noi ! Oricum, americanul asta e agreabil si pare sa-si execute corect ”menirea”. Si are si ochii albastri ! L-am urmarit in emisiunea lui Cristoiu si m-a surprins faptul ca pare a se fi implicat si sufleteste in studiul istoriei noastre recente. Asta e bine ! Poate ii zice cineva La Multi Ani si din partea cititorilor acestui site !Sa stie ca-l urmarim cu simpatie ! Si va mai rog sa scrieti undeva cum putem gasi cartea americanului ! Multumesc si La Multi Ani tuturor !

  5. Chestia cu “Jos Ciauşescu” a fost vehiculată încă din 1990 (Zig-Zag nr. 15/1990, revistă condusă de Ion Cristoiu, cunoscut militant pentru oprirea tuturor proceselor intentate criminalilor revoluţiei) ca dovadă a prezenţei agenţilor străini. Problema e că au fost sute de lozinci “jos Ceauşescu” scrise corect în acea perioadă, ce relevanţă are una bucată lozincă scrisă greşit? Posibil să fie un copil care abia învăţase să scrie, sau cineva care a greşit din neatenţie.

  6. Constantin Dobre

    @ RAH

    You’ve said, I quote: “It truly strains the imagination to believe that the Romanian authorities were so “frightened” of committing a diplomatic incident with the Soviets that they would allow Soviet agents to roam the country virtually unhindered, allowing them to go anywhere and do anything they wanted”

    I am really surprised you do not understand that at the time in such very hostile and confruntational situation (“with friends like this…”, hypocrite Western countries plus Malta’s agreements) Romania did its very best to avoid any diplomatic incident. Holding such view it is time wasting explaining why Laszlo Tokes, in clear breach of the Romanian law, was not arrested and put him on trial before so-called revolution.

  7. gogu

    Simplu, simplu, dar aseara zicea Cristoiu ca s-a epuizat ! Asadar vom merge la biblioteca, dupa ce ne vom delecta cu traducerea stilcita a articolului si comentariilor de mai sus, facuta cu un motor din asta…..Multumesc oricum !

  8. Victor Roncea


    @ Marius Mioc

    Draga Marius, nu stiu de ce ai stilul asta alambicat de a amesteca o marturie – respectiv a mea – cu catalogarile pe care le acorzi tu unei reviste din anii ’90 si lui Ion Cristoiu in special. Vorbim asadar de marturia mea directa. Si, daca ai citit-o, atunci ai vazut ca m-am referit la mai multe lozinci scrise de mai multe maini. Si nu, nu era nici un copil ratacit cu bidoane de vopsea la revolutie. “Argumentele” tale si ale lui RAH sunt de copii 🙂

  9. Constantin Dobre

    @ RAH

    You’ve said, I quote: “It truly strains the imagination to believe that the Romanian authorities were so “frightened” of committing a diplomatic incident with the Soviets that they would allow Soviet agents to roam the country virtually unhindered, allowing them to go anywhere and do anything they wanted”

    I am really surprised you do not understand that at the time in such very hostile and confruntational situation (“with friends like this…”, hypocrite Western countries plus Malta’s agreements) Romania did its very best to avoid any diplomatic incident. Holding such view it is time wasting explaining why Laszlo Tokes, in clear breach of the Romanian law, was not arrested and put him on trial before so-called revolution.

    Much more later on “Ziaristi Online”.

  10. Constantin Dobre

    “Turisti” sovietici, barbati si femei, au fost cazati la etajele superioare ale fostului hotel Majestic si actionau in Piata Universitatii. Am locuit la acel hotel la acea vreme si i-am vazut si auzit cu ochii si urechile mele. Toata ziua faceau diversiuni si identificau agitatorii (posibil si inamicii din Vest) in Piata Universitatii si tarziu in noapte se retrageau la barul hotelului de la parter, se imbatau ca porcii si pe treptele spre camerele lor se regulau. In conversatiile lor in limba rusa (limba pe care eu n-o cunosteam) am tresarit cind am auzit expresia „tavarsci maghiureanu”. Sint convins ca actionau in stransa relatie cu SRI, respectiv VM. In anul 2007 am incercat sa pun mana (pe bani grei, evident) pe registrele de intrare-iesire ale hotelului din acea perioada, dar a fost prea tarziu: mi s-a spus, din mai multe surse, ca acele registre au fost ridicate de SRI. Alte surse mi-au confirmat, tot in anul 2007, ca acele registre se aflau si atunci in arhivele SRI. Nu stiu daca-ar fi posibil, prin Aurel I. Rogojan si chiar Larry Watts, sa fie cercetate acele registre din care pot fi copiate datele de identificare ale acelor „turisti” si chiar in conectie cu secventele filmate din Piata Univ. sa se concluzioneze rolul si actiunile acestora. Stiu, e o operatiune delicata si meticuloasa dar cred ca se merita incercat.

  11. RAH

    Monica N. Marginean: Sa revenim la datele concrete ale regiei de care vorbeam anterior. Cum arata, de pilda, povestea atit de dezbatuta la procesul lui Nicu Ceausescu a cursei ROMBAC, daca o privim din perspectiva Comisiei de ancheta?

    fostul procuror Marian Valer: In mod normal, cursa de avion Bucuresti-Sibiu trebuia sa decoleze de pe aeroportul Baneasa, la orele 17,10 folosindu-se pe acest traseu avioane marca Antonov. In dupa-amiaza zilei de 20 decembrie, insa, in jurul orelor 17, deci in apropierea orei prevazute pentru decolarea cursei obisnuite, pasagerii pentru Sibiu au fost invitati si dusi la Aeroportul Otopeni unde au fost imbarcati intr-un avion marca ROMBAC care a decolat in jurul orelor 18,30 si a aterizat pe aeroportul Sibiu in jur de ora 19. Fac precizarea ca in dupa-amiaza aceleiasi zile, cu aproape 2 ore inaintea decolarii acestei curse, a aterizat pe aeroportul Otopeni avionul prezidential cu care Ceausescu s-a reintors din Iran. Conform datelor furnizate de agentia TAROM Bucuresti, in avionul respectiv spre Sibiu au fost imbarcati 81 pasageri. In radiograma cursei sint consemnate domiciile doar la o parte din pasageri, cu mentiunea ca unele sint incomplete, lipsind fie localitatea, fie strada, fie numarul, iar la restul pasagerilor figureaza doar mentiunile ,rezervat’ sau Pasaport RSR. In urma investigatiilor efectuate, au putut fi identificati doar 44 de pasageri, majoritatea avind domiciliul in municipul si judetul Sibiu, stabilindu-se ca au fost persoane trimise in delegatie la foruri tutelare din capitala, sau studenti plecati in vacanta, iar citiva domiciliati in judetul Alba. Mentionez ca asupra acestor persoane nu planeaza nici un dubiu. Dubiile sint create insa in primul rind de faptul ca mai multi pasageri figureaza cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, dar in realitate nu domiciliaza la adresele consemnate, iar la unele adrese sint intreprinderi. Un alt element creator de dubii il constituie prezenta in avionul respectiv a unui inspector de la Departmentul Aviatiei Civile, cu numele de Nevrozeanu, care nu figureaza pe lista pasagerilor si cu privire la care s-a stabilit ca, in trecut, se deplasa cu avionul in cazuri speciale doar pe relatia Moscova, fiind un bun cunoscator al limbii ruse. Mai multi pasageri sustin ca in partea dreapta din fata a avionului au sesizat un grup de barbati, mai inalti, atletici, imbracati sportiv, multi dintre ei fiind blonzi, grup care li s-a parut suspect. Aceste afirmatii se coroboreaza cu faptul ca in zona respectiva a avionului nu a stat nici unul din pasagerii identificati. Mai mult, verificindu-se la hotelurile din municipiul Sibiu persoane care aveau numele celor 37 de persoane neidentificate, s-a constatat ca doar un pasager neidentificat care figureaza pe listele TAROM-ului cu domiciliul in municipiul Bucuresti, care nu exista la adresa respectiva din localitate, a fost cazat la hotelul Bulevard, dar in registrul de evidenta figureaza cu un alt domiciliu din Bucuresti. Ambele domicilii, si cei din diagrama TAROM si cel de la hotel sint false. Cu ocazia acelorasi verificari s-a constatat ca in perioada respectiva in hotelurile din Sibiu au fost cazati multi turisti sovietici, in special la Imparatul Romanilor, Continental, si Bulevard, situate in zona centrala a municipiului. Fac mentiunea ca din hotelurile respective s-a tras asupra manifestantilor si a armatei. Am omis sa precizez ca pe aeroportul Otopeni, in avionul ROMBAC au fost incarcate sute de colete identice ca format, dimensiuni si culoare, de marime apropriata unei genti diplomat, precum si ca, cu citeva minute inaintea decolarii cursei spre Sibiu, de pe acelasi aeroport au decolat curse ROMBAC spre Timisoara si Arad. Consider ca, in legatura cu pasagerii neidentificati, sint posibile doua versiuni, respectiv sa fie au fost luptatorii U.S.L.A. trimisi in sprijinul lui Nicu Ceausescu, fie au fost agenti sovietici trimisi sa actioneze in scopul rasturnarii regimului Ceausescu.

    Monica N. Marginean: Ce alte demersuri a facut Comisia de ancheta pentru elucidarea misterului celor 37 de pasageri neidentificati?

    Marian Valer: Am luat contact cu unul din loctiitorii comandamentului trupelor U.S.L.A. din capitala, caruia i-am solicitat sa-mi puna la dispozitie pe cei trei insotitori U.S.L.A. ai avionului ROMBAC. Loctiitorul mi-a spus ca acestia au fost audiati de un procuror militar si nu mai este de acord sa fie audiati inca o data.

    Monica M. Maginean: “MARIAN VALER: Asistam la ingroparea Revolutiei,” Expres nr. 33, septembrie 1990, p. 2.

  12. Pare ciudat că domnul Richard Hall nu cunoaşte că “reţeta turistică” mai fusese utilizată cel puţin o dată: în august 1968. În timpul Primăverii de la Praga CehoSlovacia a fost împânzită de agenţi sovietici intraţi însă sub acoperire de… cetîţeni vest-germani sau din alte părţi ale occidentului. Aveau rolul de a amplifica cerinţele, deci de a fi agenţi provocatori pentru ca URSS să aibe pretexte şi mai mari pentru invazia ţării. Şi tot în CehoSlovacia au existat nişte victime ale invaziei: cadrele securităţii cehoslovace care se ocupau de contraspionaj, mai precis îi supravegheau pe agenţii Moscovei.

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