Larry L. Watts: The Pacepa Defection. Casting Romania as the "Prince of Thieves". The Pacepa's Mith. EXCLUSIV ZIARISTI ONLINE: O Afacere KGB care intoxica Romania si SUA de 35 de ani - Ziaristi OnlineZiaristi Online

Larry L. Watts: The Pacepa Defection. Casting Romania as the ”Prince of Thieves”. The Pacepa’s Mith. EXCLUSIV ZIARISTI ONLINE: O Afacere KGB care intoxica Romania si SUA de 35 de ani

Ion-Mihai-Pacepa-2-KGB-Foto-Pacepa.ro_ Portalul Ziaristi Online continua sa faca lumina in Afacerea Pacepa – o operatiune KGB a carei efecte urmareste Romania si dupa 35 de ani. Astazi publicam in exclusivitate, in original, Capitolul dedicat “defectarii”, i.e. a implantarii agentului KGB Ion Mihai Pacipa in tabara CIA, extras din lucrarea istoricului american Larry L. Watts “Cei dintai vor fi cei din urma“, aparuta in limba romana la Editura Rao. Insotim analiza expertului american in informatii cu prefata sa, sumarul cartii si lista de abrevieri si acronime, asa cum au fost puse la dispozitia publicului si a specialistilor de Larry L. Watts. Pentru versiunea in limba romana accesati Pacepa, spulberat definitiv de Larry Watts. Despre defectarea agentului KGB, din toaleta Catedralei din Köln, pana in cele ale agentilor FBI si CIA pacaliti ca la Academia de Inselaciune. CAPITOL INTEGRAL via ZIARISTI ONLINE.

Author’s Preface

I first became involved in Romanian studies as a Sovietologist during the height of the post-détente Cold War. At that time, in the late 1970s, the practice of underestimating the significance of Romanian declarations, policies and actions, and of assuming similar attitudes and behavior among the other Eastern European Warsaw Pact members was already rooted among U.S. analysts of the region. Romanian sources asserting otherwise were treated with incredulity. Since Romania was then only a peripheral interest I filed this information in the back of my mind. I had, as it were, “no dog in that fight.”
My repeated visits in Romania during the 1980s and my direct exposure to the harsh living conditions imposed upon the population throughout that decade only predisposed me towards similar incredulity. Returning after the 1989 Revolution I began working with various Romanian elites on the prevention of ethnic conflict, military and intelligence reform, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) integration. Observing first-hand their genuine efforts to implement democracy despite a broken-down administrative apparatus, the unconstructive response of a decidedly unsympathetic and unhelpful West brought to mind the dismissive attitudes of U.S. analysts towards Romanian sources that I had encountered during the Cold War. Seeking to understand the causes for this perennial misperception of Romanian intent and behavior thus became a preoccupation of mine.
That preoccupation, already evident in With Friends Like These, is more explicitly examined here. Extorting Peace takes up the story of the Romanian-Warsaw Pact conflict where it left off in 1978 With Friends Like These, and brings it up to the first week of December 1989. Extorting Peace begins by addressing the difficulties presented by the Romanian anomaly for Western analysts from the beginning of the Cold War and then proceeds to a study of the clandestine struggle from the late 1970s until the eve of the Revolution that brought down the communist regime.
I do not rely on many Romanian sources. The reason being has nothing to do with any lack of solid and inspired Romanian analyses, for there are many. They are not represented here because the practice of calling into question the credibility of Romanian sources was so extensive when I began this project that I elected to avoid the risk (almost) altogether by seeking to tell the story primarily from the perspective of documents and reports issued by the other Warsaw Pact members.1 The hurdle of “common wisdom” is a daunting one and persuading others to question it requires evidence that is not merely convincing or conclusive but irrefutable. The exceptions I have allowed are documentary collections or studies with document annexes, based on the logic that they may be more easily accessed than the archives in question. The same logic motivated a website, www.larrylwatts.com, on which I have posted some 300 original documents and links from the archives of the Warsaw Pact members, from the former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, and from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. State Department and the White House, with more documents to follow.
Extorting Peace is essentially a series of case studies. Some examine the major targets of Soviet clandestine and disinformation operations, and the processes of
1 By the same token, some Western analyses are included even though of inferior quality because of the perceptions and misperceptions they reflect.
systematic misattribution within the Soviet alliance. Others focus on Romanian efforts to hinder the use of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of Soviet power projection, its use of mediation as a means of obstructing the expansion of Soviet influence in various regions of the world, and its pursuit of security and disarmament policies that constrained the exercise of Soviet military power.
The response to With Friends Like These in Romania was overwhelming for a volume of its girth and detail, with several print runs from its initial 2011 launch. Although that volume noted the very great chasm between Romania’s illiberal domestic policy and its classically liberal foreign policy, some criticized it as a “unilateral” approach for not dwelling upon the sufferings of the population under Communism. That the volume did not dwell on that suffering is certainly true.
However, With Friends Like These was intended in part to act as a corrective. Prior to its publication, post-1989 analyses of Cold War Romania that did not focus overwhelmingly and often in exaggerated fashion on domestic repression to the exclusion of its foreign and security policy and behavior were exceedingly rare. So rare, in fact, that Romania’s extraordinary Western partnerships were often interpreted as an artifact of Western misperception and the praise of five U.S. presidents and assorted European leaders the result of Western gullibility rather than accurate assessment. Even its estrangement and isolation within the Warsaw Pact was misattributed to Romania’s failure to liberalize and reform.
Explicitly stated then, the aim of these studies is to examine the role of Romania during the Cold War as state actor within an alliance system and internationally. Domestic policy is important within this context only when and where it influences Romania foreign and security policies. Extorting Peace addresses the issue of domestic policy in greater degree and frequency than did With Friends Like These because Romanian domestic policy became a major issue its relations with the West in general, and with the United States in particular, during the 1980s. However, the focus on Romania as state actor is unchanged and, I believe, justified for several reasons. First, because evidence that the USSR ever exerted or was interested in exerting pressure on Romania within the Warsaw Pact to liberalize its domestic regime during the 1980s (or at any point during the Cold War) is thin. Second, because Soviet and other Warsaw Pact member documents repeatedly stress that Moscow’s problem with Romania was due to the latter’s independent foreign and security policy – its “separate course.” And finally, because, up until the last quarter of 1989 at least, the reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev were designed primarily to increase Soviet central control over the foreign and security (and economic) policies of the other Warsaw Pact members.
Indeed, the narrow focus of much post-1989 literature on the domestic repressiveness of the regime misled more than one author to conclude that, in contrast with other former East European members of the Warsaw Pact, Romania could salvage no “usable history” from its Communist past. On the contrary, examination of Romania’s immensely popular foreign and security policies reveals that its historical past in this critical domain has greater utility than that of any of its erstwhile comrades-in-arms. That utility, I believe, has legs that extend even to the present day.
Larry L. Watts
31 March 2013

II

The Clash of 1978

Romania tries to convince [other Pact members] to follow the example of the SRR and to combat together, through joint action, the actions and measures of the USSR within the framework of the CMEA [and] the Warsaw Pact, as well as in many other questions connected with the communist and workers movement and the resolution of a series of problems of international importance.
c All of these negative tendencies in the policy of the RCP and SRR leadership encourages,
supports along all lines, and tries to use the leadership circles of the USA and China.1
CPSU CC Romanian Sector, June 1978

Beijing and Washington take advantage of the nationalistic deviations of Ceau.escu.
It is difficult to say something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor.
The devil knows what else he might possibly do.2
Leonid Brezhnev to Erich Honecker, July 1978

Regional cooperation in the Balkans is seen by the Romanians as a way to decrease the influence
of the Warsaw Pact states in the regionc We need to counteract all projects for an autonomous Balkan group.3
Brezhnev to Zhivkov, August 1978

U.S. army involves more and more reconnaissance and intelligence officers in activities for developing
relations with the Romanian Army [and] political-military cooperation with the U.S.A c
both sides work seriously to further develop bilateral relations.4
East German Stasi , September 1978

[Western leaders consider that] Romaniafs different foreign
policy positions represent gthe beginning of a new epoch in the history of the Socialist
alliance.h However, the long-term success of its policy is uncertain. The West is not in a position to
effectively support Romania because there is no defined Western position regarding this problem.5
East German Stasi, January 1979

Romania works intensely works towards the disconnection of the USSR, from the socialist countries and
from those in the course of development [and] insistently tries to draw to its side, in anti-Soviet
actions, the leaderships of Bulgaria, Poland, and the GDR. As its nationalist course becomes
more profound, the divergences between Romania and the Soviet Union and the
other fraternal countries acquires an all the more serious character and extend
to many international policy questions of principal importance. c
Of great importance here is the tendency of the USA and NATO to
strengthen Romania in the role of ginsubordinate allyh of the USSR, using it in order to
undermine the unity of the fraternal countries from inside, glooseningh of the political-military
union of the socialist states. c We can anticipate that Romania will purposefully continue the line
of gequalizingh its relationships with the principal powers that oppose us, in the contemporary world,
not only in the political domain, but also in the economic, military, cultural, etc., diminishing, at
the same time, real collaboration within the framework of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA.6
CPSU CC Romanian Sector, May 1979

The Pacepa Defection, July 1978

Chapter 2

Casting Romania as the ”Prince of Thieves”
On 26 July 1978, deputy DIE chief Ion Mihai Pacepa defected to West German intelligence in Koln and was handed over to U.S. intelligence authorities. Once in Washington, Pacepa reiterated the now familiar Soviet active measures theme – first provided to U.S. Embassy officials in 1956 and repeated to CIA and FBI debriefers by KGB defector Anatolyi Golitsyn in 1963 . that Romania was the Kremlinfs Trojan horse. According to the Romanian defector, Ceau.escu harbored a deep-seated hatred for the U.S. and personal contempt for its President, Jimmy Carter.7 Ceau.escu, he claimed, was stealing satellite, laser and computer technology from the U.S.; precisely the technology Washington had been making available to Bucharest since 1975 within the framework of U.S.-Romanian military cooperation, in order to hand it over to Moscow.8
Pacepa further decried Romaniafs alleged deception of Israel and of all moderate Arab states involved in the Middle East peace process. Bucharest, he maintained, was working hand in hand with Arab terrorists; terrorists that were secretly subordinated to Yasir Arafat . whom Pacepa also alleged to be a KGB agent.9 His litany of accusations served almost perfectly the principal purposes of Soviet and Pact-wide active measures vis-a-vis Romania . the destruction of the Romanian-American relationship, scuttling the peace process, and compromising Romaniafs relations with its Western partners and with the main actors in the Middle East.
Describing his former countryfs foreign diplomacy and intelligence operations as purposefully hostile to the United States, the Romanian defector found adherents within CIA counterintelligence and the FBI, the two institutional sectors whose professional responsibilities made them most reticent to distinguish between ebadf (pro-Moscow) Communists and egoodf (independent) Communists. Pacepa persuaded at least one FBI officer that efforts to maintain Romanian access to the Most Favored Nation clause, which allowed the country to trade with the U.S. without prohibitive tariffs, as well as Bucharestfs on-going efforts to improve Romanian-American economic relations more generally, were all part of a hostile covert operation in which gthe DIE residence in Washington recruited or tried to recruit diverse personalities of the Romanian emigration, who were then given the task of lobbying for ethe Clause.fh10 This approach, treating Romanian lobbying efforts as hostile activity, was antithetical to that which Americans adopted towards Polish and Hungarian attempts to maintain their MFN status (only very recently awarded to Budapest but enjoyed on a permanent basis by Warsaw with no annual reviews since 1960). Their far more extensive lobby efforts, possible because of their much larger emigre communities in the U.S., were considered reflections of normal, healthy, and admirable sentiment regarding their ethnic homeland.
The statement by one of Pacepafs advocates in the FBI, that ”operation ’Clause’ helped us more than the Romanians” because it allowed the FBI ”to know and to neutralize a good part of the DIE residency’s agents of influence”, indicates how successful the defector was in persuading parts of the U.S. intelligence community that did not deserve Most Favored Nation status and that its attempt to retain that status was illegitimate.11 Likewise, the presumption that Romanian economic and diplomatic representatives were security officers or subordinate to security services to an extent markedly different than the other Bloc members, or that all Securitate officers at the Romanian Embassy were running hostile operations against U.S. interests . and, conversely, that diplomats and intelligence officials from Moscow loyalist regimes in Poland and Hungary were gcleanerh in this regard . was erroneous on both counts. Polish intelligence had begun placing its officers and agents in foreign trade posts and in joint ventures gas early as 1946,h and had done so in the foreign ministry and other institutions operating abroad since the early 1950s.12 Likewise, Hungary wholly subordinated its foreign ministry apparatus to intelligence and propaganda requirements.13 Budapest especially exploited cultural and scientific contacts and exchanges in order to influence conservative and right-wing circles in the West, including among the Hungarian emigre communities; circles that would not otherwise be accessible or sympathetic along political or economic lines.14
After the Cold War, the German officer who brought Pacepa in from his sanctuary in the pissoir under the Koln Cathedral in July 1978 became head of unified Germanyfs Federal Office for the Defense of the Constitution. In 1996 he confided to his Romanian foreign intelligence counterpart that the Germans had handed Pacepa over to the Americans within 72 hours of his defection partly because it was clear to them that he was a Soviet plant.15 Pacepa later confirmed on multiple occasions that while a senior officer of Romanian foreign intelligence he gused to take orders from the Soviet KGB,h explicitly stating that gI spent 27 years of my life working for the KGB,h thus accounting for the entire length of his service in the Securitate from his formal engagement (already with officer rank) in 1951 until his defection in 1978.16
According to an internal report of the Stasi, West German counter-intelligence officers sent to Washington to de-brief Pacepa found his declarations unconvincing and inconsistent, leading them to conclude that he intended, gthrough the intermediary of his visibly poor information, to buy the right to an assured old age in the USA from the CIA, protected from the investigations of his former friends.h17 This was an exaggeration. As a Soviet double agent in Romania, Pacepa had considerable knowledge of KGB operations in the Soviet Bloc. And, as Ceau.escufs security adviser, he accompanied his boss on many foreign visits and would have had some knowledge as to what was discussed. Whether he represented the substance of those discussions accurately to his American interlocutors is another question entirely. His 1987 book suggests that he did not.
The Stasi also reported West German intelligence suspicions that Pacepa had been under investigation for inventing gsalary lists for dubious agents in order to request a good source of revenue.h18 Given the close ties between West German intelligence and the Securitate at that time . West Germanyfs anti-terrorist unit, GSG 9, had assisted the Romanians in organizing their anti-terrorism unit (Unitatea Speciala pentru Lupta Anti-Terorista: USLA) in 1977 . Bucharest and Bonn probably exchanged communications on the defector. The post-defection Department of State Security (DSS) inquiry identified Pacepa, his boss foreign intelligence director Nicolae Doicaru, foreign counterintelligence chief Mihai Caraman, anti-KGB unit chief Constantin Iosif and sometime interior minister and DSS chief Ion St.nescu as responsible for maintaining an environment of generalized corruption at the top of the security service that permitted them to evade any supervision of the DIE for some 25 years.19 As the internal inquiry noted, the group provided gifts and filled shopping lists when abroad for senior party members, thus purchasing freedom from oversight . a striking admission about the state of corruption among the senior party and security leadership every bit as damning as anything Pacepa later published.20
Along with that corruption, Pacepafs closest collaborators were implicated in the unauthorized expropriation of Jewish and German emigre properties in shakedown operations that repeatedly provoked Western protest and threatened Romaniafs MFN status.21 According to the internal inquiry conducted by Romanian authorities after his defection:
Recently [discovered] materials indicate that the qualities characteristic of many former DGIE cadre were corruption, prevarication, desire to arrive, and tendency towards self-aggrandizement. Existing data indicate that, due to the concealment from the interior ministry leadership of abuses and illegalities committed by over 100 personnel that bought dwellings in Bucharest from persons who later emigrated from the country, those personnel were not held accountable according to the law.22
Once in the United States, Pacepa insisted on the anti-Semitic nature of Romania policy and Ceau.escu in particular. Significantly, those allegations, later debunked by various Israeli officials, were plausible mainly due to unsanctioned actions in which Pacepafs circle was directly implicated.23 After 1989, more than one former Israeli ambassador to Romania during the 1980s confirmed that Ceau.escufs mediation efforts in the Middle East not only had been made in good faith but had actually borne fruit.24 Why, then, did the Romanian defector continued to propagate what were also KGB disinformation themes aimed against Romanian policy in the Middle East that he knew to be false after he arrived in the U.S.?
The new heads of the interior ministry and the DSS were especially incensed to discover that despite its self-publicity of allegedly phenomenal performance, in fact, the DIEfs scientific-technical branch for which Pacepa had direct responsibility had made no noteworthy technological acquisitions in either Germany or the U.S.. Virtually all of the documents and equipment provided under Pacepafs watch were found to originate from open sources. His self-advertised covert procurement successes consisted largely of technical mastersf degree theses and doctoral dissertations freely accessible at U.S. universities, and equipment legally purchased on the open market and at trade shows.25 Moreover, the pride of place that Pacepa gave to Romanian technological espionage against the US in his damning post-defection claims served to distract from the far more extensive acquisition efforts of other Pact allies.26
Accusing Romania of stealing U.S. and Western technology for Moscow as a means of sowing suspicion regarding the ultimate purposes of its economic and military policies had been a central Soviet active measures theme since the early 1960s, designed to undermine the U.S.-Romanian relationship. In part, its aim was to block more intimate military cooperation with the US and sabotage that which already existed. It also sought to prevent the creation of a significant long-term U.S. economic interest in the country, and to obstruct Bucharest from developing even greater economic capacities for exercising its independence. And there was no one in a better position to propagate it.
His former job as head of the Science and Technology (S&T) section of the DSS lent Pacepa inherent plausibility when it came to intelligence operations in that domain. He depicted Ceau.escu as one of the Kremlinfs most faithful satraps, who yearned to gmake a substantial increase in his contributionh of stolen technology to Moscow in order to achieve a personal aim of becoming gthe most important and respected Soviet partner within the Warsaw Pact.h27 Pacepa continued beating this drum to great effect throughout the rest of the Cold War and afterwards, persuading influential American journalists, diplomats, politicians, and analysts outside of the intelligence community that Romania was a Soviet Trojan horse and a treacherous, inappropriate partner for the United States.28
Alerted by the insistent claims of Pacepa and his partisans, the agencies comprising the U.S. intelligence community placed Romania under close scrutiny when examining Soviet technology acquisition operations. What they found was very much the opposite of what Pacepa alleged, and very much in line with the internal complaints of Soviet intelligence.29 For example, in June 1982, some four years after Pacepa first began propagating the myth of Romaniafs anti-American procurement operations, U.S. intelligence agencies unanimously concurred that, in striking contrast to the rest of the Soviet Bloc members, Romania was in fact gnot responsive to Soviet tasking for collection activities.h30
President Ronald Reagan underscored the fact that Romania was the only partner in the Soviet Bloc to which the U.S. could transfer technology and ease export controls without fear of indirectly supplying Moscow. Addressing the problematic transfer issue in connection with his administrationfs gdifferentiation policyh in September 1982, President Reagan noted that since gthere is a high probability that technology legally sold to any Eastern European country other than Romania will be passed on to the Soviet Union,h it would gnot be possible to differentiate in the provision of COCOM-controlled production and process technology.h31 In 1988, one year after the publication of Pacepafs book that repeated those allegations to a far broader public, Pentagon analysts concluded that the Romanians did not gact as surrogates for Soviet intelligenceh due to their glooser ties to the Soviets in the intelligence arena,h nor did the observed behavior of Romanian representatives in the US indicate that the gcollection of highly sensitive S&T informationh was even a priority for them.32
Pacepa’s specific claims provided circumstantial evidence suggesting that Bucharest was justified in suspecting him of being an agent of both Moscow and Budapest, engaged in discrediting active measures against Romania and gprestige buildingh measures in support of Hungary. The defector identified East Germany, Romania and Poland . in that order . as carrying out the most significant theft of U.S. technology. Aside from his disingenuous and wholly inaccurate inclusion of Romania in that group, he inexplicably absented Hungary altogether (a consistent oversight in Pacepafs writings.) In fact, the principal East European S&T contribution to Moscow that was stolen from the US came from those intelligence services with sizeable co-national emigre communities, larger official representations, and multiple locations within the US from which to operate, with, as the U.S. intelligence community noted in one of its National Intelligence Estimates, gPoland and Hungary apparently being major East European participants.h33
For example, by exploiting its ability to recruit members of the ethnic Polish community in the US, Warsaw managed to steal a wide range of US technology for the Kremlin. The Marian Zacharski.William Holden Bell ring, for instance, netted Moscow documents on gthe F-15 look-down, shoot-down radar, the quiet radar system for the B-1 and Stealth bomber, an all-weather radar system for tanks, an experimental radar system for the U.S. Navy, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, a shipborne surveillance radar, the Patriot surface-to-air missile, and a NATO air defense system.h34 Likewise, Hungarian state security was able to recruit an ethnic Hungarian in the US military . Zoltan Szabo, who created the Clyde Lee Conrad network . for one of the longest-running espionage operations involving technology acquisition.35 The Szabo-Conrad network was even more infamous for stealing NATOfs strategy and operational plans against the Warsaw Pact, plans for the movement of troops, tanks and aircraft, and detailed descriptions of nuclear weapons and weapons sites.36 As a matter of course, the Hungarian AVH placed technologically-savvy officers gunder cover in Hungarian foreign trade enterprises concerned with specialized fields such as electronic equipment and computersh to gobtain covertly from Western businessmen S&T information and embargoed items.h37
Although Polish espionage efforts dealt a significant blow to US national security, they ranked only fourth among the gclosely cooperatingh partners in terms of the number of agents arrested by US counterintelligence and law enforcement. East Germany ranked first and Hungary second, followed by Czechoslovakia with Poland close behind.38 In several cases the recruited agent was working for both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as Hungary had an extensive network within that country (composed largely of non-ethnic Hungarians), which facilitated bilateral cooperation.39 A mid-1980s update on the Soviet Blocfs theft of sophisticated, especially military, technology by the U.S. intelligence community came to essentially the same conclusions:
Since the mid-to-late 1970s the surrogates among these services have played a major role in the overall VPK [Voenno-Promyshlennaya Kommissiya: Soviet Military-Industrial Commission] collection program, often in return for Soviet economic concessions to their countries. The intelligence services of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary are among the most successful in acquiring Western classified data and export controlled products.40
Romania, in contrast, was not implicated in any of the espionage rings operating in the US during the 1980s (nor had it been during the previous decade).41 This absence from the ranks of those actively undertaking operations against Americafs interests is all the more noteworthy given that a half-dozen of the spies arrested by US authorities during that period worked for states deemed friendly or neutral by Washington.42 Bucharest not only refrained from engaging in the illegal covert procurement of US sophisticated technology, especially of the military variety, it did not even figure among the Warsaw Pact thieves that frequently engaged in that practice on the behalf of the Kremlin.
After 1989, US investigators conducted an inquiry in Romania, with the approval of that countryfs democratically-elected authorities, in order to verify its role in the theft of sophisticated US technology. As usual when disinformation comes up against serious verification, the allegations proved essentially groundless. The only instance discovered of significant technology theft that negatively prejudiced the US (in terms of lost profit) was the safety-glass windshield technology used in the manufacture of Romaniafs Dacia automobile. And it remains unclear how that technology came to be used in a manufacturing process that Bucharest ran under French license.
Alleging Soviet Agency, Discrediting Romania’s Friends
Pacepafs claim that Romanian policies towards the Developing World were designed to further Soviet objectives was also debunked by contemporary US intelligence.43 The charge was plausible because, from the mid-1950s until the late 1970s, Romania was the largest donor of non-Soviet and non-military assistance to the Developing World. At the same time, Romanian assistance was also gthe most diversifiedh within in the Bloc in the sense that the majority of its beneficiaries were not Soviet clients, while all Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, East German and Hungarian aid benefited only Soviet client states.44
In 1975 the CIA reported that despite the evidently gstrongh Soviet influence in the aid patterns of most East European states to the Developing World, Romania was notable for its ability gto exercise independence in making individual commitments.h45 Romanian policy towards the Developing World was one of the most sophisticated and variegated in either the East or the West, a sophistication enabled by frequent direct communication with developing world leaders . often derided as frivolous diplomatic gtourismh in Soviet active measures . such that Bucharest eventually rivaled Belgrade in terms of its influence and forward-looking policy towards the region (in spite of Titofs considerable influence within the Non-Aligned Movement).46
At the end of 1979, more than a year after Pacepafs defection, the US intelligence community concluded that while the non-Soviet Bloc members provided gsupport to Third World nations and insurgent movements, often in close cooperation with the USSR,h Romania pursued gobjectives vis-a-vis the Third World that differ radically from those of the USSR and that do not purposely serve Soviet interests.h47 Romanian efforts to gplay the larger international role of mediator . as opposed to partisan,h had greatly curtailed its involvement in Soviet-sponsored military assistance programs, making it a marginal contributor of military aid to the developing world in comparison with all the other Pact members.48 Regarding specific zones of Soviet-American competition, Bucharestfs approach accorded much more closely with the aims of US policy.
While Moscow and the loyalist partners (together with Cuba and Vietnam) were busily furnishing arms to and fomenting anti-American revolution in Latin America . for example, in Mexico, Nicaragua and Honduras . the Romanians, as Fidel Castro complained, were using their influence regionally gto stir up rousing distrust of the Soviet Union.h49 In both policy and action Romania not only failed to show solidarity with Soviet-sponsored operations globally, it criticized and opposed them, for example by calling for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Africa.50 Here again, Pacepa claimed the situation was entirely the reverse, insisting that Romania was the foremost collaborator of Castro and Cuban intelligence in its anti-American operations.51 U.S. intelligence investigations did not corroborate the defectorfs allegations. On the contrary, the CIA reconfirmed in the mid-1980s that gRomania has consistently refused to devote aid resources to Marxist clientsh of the Soviet Union.52
US assessments related to Pacepafs charges were classified at the time and thus did not provide a corrective to his much better advertised disinformation. Consequently, active measures depicting Romania as duplicitous and thieving . ironically, even more so than the Soviet loyalist regimes . continued to mislead long after the information upon which they were based had been debunked. The circle of journalists, analysts, diplomats and politicians misled by the active measures campaign so personified by Pacepa would eventually encompass the powerful head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jesse Helms, and even President Ronald Reagan.53
Given that the continued propagation of erroneous assessments based on compromised information constituted one of the most frequently-encountered gorganizational pathologiesh in intelligence analysis, the failure to factor these countervailing reports into estimates of Romanian behavior became an internally-driven problem even though it was originally an artifact of externally-generated disinformation. Once expressed explicitly in reports and analyses, gimpressions made on discredited informationh retained their force long after the information itself had been revealed as false simply because analysts regularly . and naturally . relied on previous assessments as background and orientation for current ones.54 The damage had been done and ghindsight biash would ensure that it was perpetuated. As one authority phrased it, gone the bell has rung, it cannot be unrung.h55
Pacepa also sought to compromise the reputations of US authorities involved in and sympathetic to the U.S.-Romanian gspecial relationship.h Such was the case with Harry Barnes, Jr., the U.S.Ambassador to Romania during 1974-1977. Barnes had served in a lesser capacity at the Bucharest embassy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During that earlier period, and although unbeknownst to Barnes, President Johnsonfs special envoy, Averell Harriman, was working with Bucharest on Operation PACKERS . Romanian mediation efforts in the Vietnam War . as well as on the Sino-American rapprochement undertaken by Bucharest at LBJfs behest.56 Although not read into the Vietnam mediation, Barnes had sat in on both Nixon-Ceau.escu summit meetings in 1969 and 1970 and was aware of Romanian mediation efforts between Washington and Beijing.
Pacepa insisted that Barnes was leaking US intelligence to Romanian state security. At one and the same time the defector accused the Ambassador of being as gnaive as they comeh and then contradictorily explained that it was necessary for his people to keep ga much closer eyeh on him than his predecessors because he spoke the Romanian language well, had many contacts in the country, was suspected of being ga deep-cover CIA officer,h and gwas very sympathetic to Bucharestfs trumpeted independence.h57 In other words, the gnaiveh Barnes was targeted because he was well-informed, well-connected, and supportive of Romanian policies that also served U.S. interests. Pacepa continued to insist on his charges against Ambassador Barnes throughout the 1980s, long after they had been debunked in separate investigations by the FBI and by the State Department under the Carter administration, and again by an investigation undertaken under the Reagan administration.58
Presidential Special Envoy Averell Harriman was perhaps the best informed of Romaniafs contribution to common US-Romanian interests.59 Considered one of the most important American statesmen of the 20th century in his own right; Harriman was also targeted by Soviet operations to discredit him as a Soviet spy during the 1960s, culminating in CIA counterintelligence chief James Jesus Angeltonfs abortive Operation DINOSAUR, which Angelton had instigated at Golitsynfs insistence.60 In 1972, when The Washington Post quoted passages from the diplomatic volumes of the Pentagon Papers denigrating the ability and credibility of the Romanians in their efforts to bring about negotiations during the Vietnam War, Harriman took the trouble to set the record straight.61
When Harrimanfs reputation proved unassailable, he was targeted by a KGB recruitment operation in the early 1970s, and again in an operation personally approved by Andropov in 1975 to penetrate Harrimanfs ginner circle.h62 In any event, Americans involved in furthering the US-Romanian partnership became persons of uncommon interest of the unfriendliest sort for Soviet and Pact intelligence services, including by double agents within Romanian security organs.63 The gclosely cooperatingh partner services and their assets in Romania variously undertook to discredit, recruit or provoke them with the aim of compromising that relationship.64

The DSS in Disarray
A few months before the Pacepa defection, at the beginning of March 1978, the commander of the Romanian 2nd Army and head of its Bucharest Garrison, General Nicolae Militaru, was apprehended while passing highly classified materials to Soviet military intelligence. Paradoxically, in the autumn of 1971 Militaru had directly followed exposed GRU agent General Ion .erb into that post, after .erb informed his interrogators that the GRU sought the personnel files of several Romanian general officers previously trained in the USSR, including Militaru.65 Ceau.escu had intended to appoint Militaru deputy defense minister that April, shortly before he departed for his state visit in Washington.66 Instead, Militaru was cashiered from the army and shunted off as deputy minister for industrial construction, a position he eventually would lose for conspiring with another GRU network.67
Militarufs treason, discovered by the Securitatefs Military Security section (Directorate IV), brought former DIE chief Nicolae Doicaru, his deputy Ion Mihai Pacepa, the chief of the anti-KGB unit (UM 0920/A) Constantin Iosif, and DIE counterintelligence head Mihai Caraman under closer scrutiny and more critical review by the party leadership.68 Several days after Militarufs arrest, on 7 March 1978, Doicaru was dismissed as DIE chief after holding the job for almost a quarter century.69 The DIE was re-baptized the DGIE.70
The minister of interior was likewise relieved of his post and the DSS was re-subordinated to the interior ministry.71 Tudor Postelnicu was appointed the new chief of the DSS.72 The anti-KGB unit, transferred out from under the subordination of the foreign intelligence branch and made an independent unit, was physically re-located and restructured during 1978-1980. Constantin Iosif remained its chief for a short while longer, during which time, according to later DSS investigation, he continued to provide information to Doicaru and Pacepa outside the chain of command while engaging in the unapproved destruction of ga lot of material.h73
Now re-branded UM 0110, the anti-KGB unit was given significantly more resources, enlarged . eventually comprising more than 400 personnel . and refocused on its primary mission: combating hostile Soviet and Warsaw Pact operations against Romanian targets. From March through June 1978, during the months immediately prior to his defection, Pacepa made persistent efforts to reassert control over the newly independent UM 0110 . a major target of Soviet espionage.74 Subsequent investigation revealed that during this period Doicaru and Pacepa were burning the dossiers of identified and suspected KGB and GRU agents, and that former anti-KGB unit chief Constantin Iosif had been used by Doicaru gas liaison officer with the Soviet intelligence servicesh in order to maintain unauthorized clandestine contact with the KGB.75
Pacepa’s defection provoked another wholesale turnover in the leadership of the security and intelligence apparatus during July.October 1978. Doicarufs short-lived replacement as foreign intelligence chief was replaced and the DGIE was re-branded yet once more as the Centrul de informa.ii externe . the Foreign Intelligence Center or CIE.76 Stasi reports suggest that the Pacepa intimate most directly responsible for the shake-down of Jewish and German emigrants may have been arrested along with Doicaru.77
The DSS investigation revealed tremendous personnel vulnerabilities initially created during the tenure of the gNot-So-Magnificent Fiveh . former Interior Minister Ion St.nescu, Doicaru, Pacepa, Caraman and Iosif . at the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s. The latter four were all exposed as Soviet agents during DSS inquiries in 1978-1979. St.nescu was assessed as bearing responsibility for the poor supervision of the DSS that permitted the other four to operate as a rogue element during his tenure. Surprisingly, the investigation did not prompt a thorough vetting of DIE field officers that may have been recruited by Soviet intelligence organs under their benevolent eye.78 Nor was there any investigation of senior Romanian Communist Party leaders complicit in protecting the DIE from any oversight or control, even though the inquiry explicitly recommended it.
The decision to unceremoniously end the process of gwalking back the cath . tracing backwards the career path of the defector to identify the compromised operations and personnel for purposes of damage limitation and in order to identify necessary changes to decrease the likelihood of similar occurrences . was taken by two long-time members of Elena Ceau.escufs circle, newly appointed DSS head Teodor Postelnicu (who also sat on the Partyfs Central Committee), and long-time Securitate General Nicolae Ple.i.a (a candidate CC member since November 1979). Postelnicu was considered the most important of Elenafs advisors.79 Ple.i.a, a high-ranking Securitate officer even under Alexandru Draghici, had been Elena Ceau.escufs bodyguard and a deputy interior minister since the mid-1970s.
Backed by Postelnicu, Ple.i.a took it upon himself to end the investigation, halt the vetting process, and abandon the reconstruction of CIE (foreign intelligence Unit 0920) that had been underway since Pacepafs defection. The extent of the housecleaning required, and the devastating toll of the Doicaru-Pacepa-Caraman leadership, was set out in some detail by a former counterintelligence chief brought in to assist the Pacepa inquiry. Redressing the problem, the counterintelligence chief explained, would require radical measures. It was especially necessary that the Party and DSS leadership:

– Dissolve Unit 0920 (it must be eradicated, or salted and sown anew).

– Seal and verify the archives by a collective from outside the Department [of State Security], certainly with Party activists as well. Some very special sectors should be verified by someone designated by the head of state.

– Suspend N. Doicaru from any and all functions (eventually suspending others as well) and place him at the disposition of the inquiry commission . as he is now pulling strings in order to escape from his difficulties.

– Urgently recall all clandestine officers back to the country, as well as some of the most valuable agents, down to the third-level officers on their post. Caution: some of these clandestine officers may already be recruited [by hostile services]c

– Regarding the current officers of the Department:
. Pension some;
. Move others to the reserve; especially the younger ones, because they were observed passing over this wave [and] they will advance in their careers with a fundamental handicap; they have been exposed as intelligence officers;
. Reassign others within the interior of the apparat.
The problem is a delicate one [and] it must be undertaken with care.

– Create a new apparat, with a conception well-delineated beforehand [and] a statutory working methodology; completely covert, with no tie to the official apparatus.

– [Create] a superior organ for oversight. This organism should work according to a statute approved by the head of state.

– Transfer some of the political intelligence tasks to the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], as it now is in most other countries. This measure is now imposed upon us, at least until a new organism is born.81

Limiting the degree of unsupervised discretionary powers and closely evaluating the past performance of its officers certainly would have curbed the informalism and corruption within the DIE/DGIE/CIE and made the identification of compromised and vulnerable personnel easier. Implementing these recommendations also would have ended the stranglehold on foreign intelligence reporting established through the concerted efforts of Doicaru, Pacepa and Caraman since the early 1970s.82 Instead of carrying out that reform, however, Ple.i.a set himself up as the principal echampionf of the CIE against eoutsiderf encroachment, defending existing personnel, structures, practices and prerogatives against any thoroughgoing restructuring and misrepresenting reform efforts as an attack on Romaniafs foreign intelligence capability.
According to Ple.i.a, senior officers and gother cadreh had been gplaced under investigation unjustlyh when they were most needed; the services could not afford gto wait and be verifiedh; and Pacepafs desertion was not nearly as damaging as the gdemolition by Ceau.escu and the team constituted by him for the investigation of the affair.h83 Ple.i.a (and others) proved successful in arguing that the attempt at verification and reform be abandoned. He later boasted that he had shut down the reform and grapidly healedh the institution such that virtually the same persons could continue to operate in the same manner as before.84
Ple.i.afs arguments against reform were lent plausibility by the increasingly aggressive operations launched against Romania by its erstwhile ealliesf and because of the genuine risk of undermining mission effectiveness inherent in any thorough-going intelligence transformation. On the other hand, the Pacepa inquiry had not uncovered only insignificant shortcomings of personnel and practices that might be redressed with minor tinkering. Its findings described a service gone rogue. A service that was actively compromising Romaniafs international partnerships and rendering the country more vulnerable to hostile influence both at home and abroad. The inquiry and related investigations had exposed a service that consistently forsook missions that served national security for activities of personal aggrandizement and, worse, for missions that directly undermined Romanian security and foreign policy, particularly by compromising its cooperation with the West, in the West.85
Ple.i.a simply rejected those findings. Although formally serving as CIE director only during 1980-1984, after 1989 Ple.i.a claimed to have played a leading role in channeling and shutting down the Pacepa inquiries in 1979, and rolling back some of the measures taken in the wake of Pacepafs defection.86 He was certainly in a position and had the necessary contacts to have exerted such influence informally.
The virtual flood of Romanian intelligence defectors during 1978-1984 (a goodly number of which were undoubtedly members of the pro-Soviet network providing confirmation of Pacepafs allegations) was the clearest sign that a serious problem existed. Ple.i.afs subsequent initiatives and actions beginning several weeks prior to his formal appointment in 1980 indicate that he was very much a part of the problem. His appointment highlighted the catastrophically defective personnel process responsible for peopling the upper reaches of the Romanian Party and state command hierarchies.
While all Romanian defectors in this wave were certainly not agents gdoubledh or gtripledh by the GRU and KGB (or by their subordinate East European services), blanket presumption of their authenticity was at least equally unwarranted. Cuban intelligence provided the US with the definitive cautionary tale in this regard. As the result of a 1987 high-level gwalk-in,h and after painstaking investigation, the CIA was forced to conclude that gevery Cuban agent recruited by the agency over the past twenty years was a double . pretending to be loyal to the United States while working in secret for Havana.h87 In the Romanian case, false defectors almost invariably worked for Moscow or one of its proxies (Hungarian and East German intelligence principally.)
Dismantling Romanian Military Intelligence
The turf war between Elena Ceau.escu, who as CC secretary in charge of Party and State Cadres had control over the personnel of all Party and state institutions, and her brother-in-law General Ilie Ceau.escu, who with his brotherfs backing had protected the military officer corps, now grew even more heated. Elena sought to extend her control over the military, constraining what she viewed as the armyfs disrespectful independence, with its pronounced anti-Socialist and pro-American overtones, at every opportunity. This created such intra-familial and intra-Party animosity that it became apparent to outside observers.
The relationship degenerated further in 1978 only apparently because of a perceived failure of the Center for Military History and Theory, where Ilie Ceau.escu worked, to accord Elena Ceau.escu what she deemed proper respect during an unannounced visit.88 She thus set in motion a series of punitive measures attempting to close down the Center and confiscate military properties, even attempting to destroy the architectural jewel of the Romanian Armed Forces, the Military Circle (Cerc Militar) that had been built in the early 1930s with donations from the officer corps itself. These internal frictions were exploited by Soviet agents within the Party leadership, particularly by the former Cominternists that still dominated the RCPfs propaganda and ideological sections, and by individuals and possibly sections within the DIE/CIE, which encouraged Elenafs anti-military animosity in aid of its own campaign to gain control over military intelligence and monopolize intelligence reporting from abroad (in which personal ambitions, bureaucratic politics, and foreign espionage all played a role).
Elena Ceau.escufs vendetta against General Ilie Ceau.escu reached such ridiculous extremes that she signed an order as head of the Central Committeefs Commission for Party and State Cadres dismissing General Ceau.escu from his post as chief of Higher Political Council of the Army in the mid-1980s (which would have greatly diminished his ability to protect the Center for Miliary History and Theory from her depredations).89 Knowing that such a measure would have to be referred to his brother, Ilie Ceau.escu simply ignored it for the four months it took to land on the desk of Nicolae Ceau.escu, who then vetoed it.90 Western and Romanian first-hand observers reported that Elena Ceau.escu overtly resented the pro-American orientation of the military institution and actively sought to shut down Romanian-American contacts.91 By the end of the decade, a combination of internal pressures (e.g. from Elena and her circle) and external signals (principally Pact disinformation and anti-American gintoxicationh campaigns that severely distorted DSS reporting on US intentions and behavior) would persuade the Romanian leader that Washington was indeed his enemy.
The confluence of Pacepafs defection and the rise of a new DIE/DGIE/CIE leadership patronized by Elena Ceau.escu proved even more disastrous for the Military Intelligence Directorate (Directoratul Informa.ii Militare: DIM) than the perennial DIE-DIM turf wars had been.92 Just a few months before, the DIM appeared to have won the battle against the Doicaru-Pacepa-Caraman effort to unify all Romanian intelligence services under the interior ministry. At that time Nicolae Ceau.escu gcategorically rejectedh the unification initiative on the basis of a report prepared by director of military intelligence, General Dumitru Dumitru, and supported by the Chief of the General Staff, General Ion Coman. The Romanian leader had even promised that other outstanding issues would gbe resolved through a series of clarificationsh that would consolidate the institutional independence of military intelligence.93
Pacepafs defection, coming so close on the heels of the Militaru treason four months earlier, changed everything. Pacepa had managed to exert his control over gmany of the issuesh dealt with by the DIM, allowing him and the DIE to exercise gimportant influenceh regarding the employment of DIM manpower forces and resources. The opportunity offered Romania through the invitation from the US Assistant Chief of Staff for Defense Intelligence, General E. R. Thompson, to General Dumitru to visit the Pentagon for discussions in September 1978 may have been first casualty of this contamination.94
Ironically, the attempt by the DIE leadership (Doicaru, Pacepa, Caraman etc.) to extend its control over all foreign intelligence gathering and reporting that had been so recently defeated was now achieved under the new DSS chief Tudor Postelnicu as part of the gdamage limitation measuresh undertaken after the Militaru and Pacepa treasons. On 16 October 1978, after fifteen years on the job, and one month after his scheduled meeting with General Thompson in the US, General Dumitru was removed as chief of the General Stafffs Military Intelligence Directorate and transferred to the command of the Tactical Artillery Faculty at the Military Academy.95
A change in recruitment policy had even more devastating long-term impact. From the mid-1960s until the end of 1978 the DIM recruited its officers from among first year students at civilian universities, providing grants and military training during academic holidays until they graduated (rather like reserve officer training programs in the US). This resulted in more rounded and mature recruits able to work easily in foreign and intellectual environments. After the Militaru and Pacepa treasons all military intelligence officers were chosen from the Securitate academy at Baneasa, reducing the number of civilian university-educated officers significantly and narrowing their intellectual experience and outlook. The Baneasa academy, no matter its educational merits, reflected the prevailing mindset of the Department of State Security; not those of either civilian higher education or the military.
This change came after a 1973 decision by the Cadres Commission that all future DSS commanders should come from, or have at least three years in, gproduction.h In other words, Elena Ceau.escufs commission revisited a post-war strategy designed for a time when Romania provided few opportunities for higher education and had an 85% illiteracy rate. Almost three decades after the fact, however, when Romanian had created an extensive education system worthy of respect, the reintroduction of this out-dated policy facilitated a counter-selection.
In the worst case, such recruits failed to gain entry to one of the now prolific institutions of higher education. At best, self-selected recruits opted for gproductionh for three years specifically in order to join the DSS, reinforcing that institutional mindset. Differences in the quality of pre-1973 and post-1973-recruited DSS and military intelligence commanders was sometimes enormous, at times giving them a bipolar aspect. In this sense, Romaniafs Communist leadership bears considerable responsibility for destroying one of its primary guardians of national security.
Aside from their increasing inability to operate within the milieu in which they were supposed to gather intelligence, compulsory attendance at the DSS school meant that military intelligence now became a de facto appendage of the DSS. General Dumitrufs replacement, Rear Admiral .tefan Dinu, acquiesced to the rapid expansion of Securitate control over the DIM without even attempting to defend his institution and its officers (and his behavior during December 1989 likewise suggested that his primary concern was not Romanian national security).96 With Elena Ceau.escufs enthusiastic support the newly-branded CIE, via the interior ministry to which the DSS was again subordinated, finally managed to centralize formal intelligence reporting gincluding from the General Staff . Military Intelligence Directorate,h thereby consecrating its informational monopoly as gregular practice.h97
Romanian military intelligence was an obvious priority target for the KGB and GRU in the clandestine Soviet-Romanian struggle, even more so given the close cooperation established between the US and Romanian armies along these lines. Nonetheless, its purposeful disassembly bore all of the hallmarks of the vindictiveness for which the dictatorfs wife was infamous.98 Naturally, Soviet espionage would have been only too glad to lend a helping hand.
More than forty (40) Romanian military attache bureaus abroad were about to become collateral damage in the fall-out from the Pacepa defection. Prior to the departure of Soviet troops from the country in 1958, Romania had less than a dozen military attache bureaus accredited abroad in the then-seven other Warsaw Pact members (including Albania) as well as in Washington, London, Paris and Ankara.99 The DIM had quadrupled its coverage in the ensuing two decades.
By 1977 Romania had military attaches accredited to 48 countries, including most NATO member states (including all of North America), the Warsaw Pact countries plus Yugoslavia and Cuba, the European neutrals, and throughout Asia, the Middle East and Africa (China, Japan, North Korea, Indonesia, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Burma, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Zaire.) In fact, when the freeze and roll-back of military attaches began in 1978 the DIM was in the process of expanding this network further still, with agreements for new attache bureaus in Venezuela and Argentina already concluded.
After the Pacepa defection, 40 of those attaches were eventually recalled and not replaced. From 1980 onward Elena Ceau.escufs Commission on State and Party Cadres refused to approve the sending of any new military intelligence officers abroad, and the military attache bureaus were successively shut down as the CIE took over all foreign reporting tasks. By the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s military intelligence was unable to contribute very much at all to Romaniafs understanding of the strategic situation facing it. Only five of the previous forty-eight attache bureaus remained in existence. And only four of those had an accredited attache, less than one-tenth the intelligence coverage of a decade before. Not one of those four posts . in Belgrade, Budapest, East Berlin and Rome . was terribly relevant to the resolution of Romaniafs security dilemma in 1990.
The Pacepa defection set in train a process that broke the back of the Romanian military intelligence system, and thus that of the gnationalh as opposed to the more gParty-orientedh intelligence collection effort. What had been the most propitious institutional basis for extending the US-Romanian strategic military partnership was also scuttled in its wake. Ceau.escufs acquiescence to his wifefs desire in this left his country with the lowest level of military intelligence representation abroad of any Warsaw Pact member, and among the lowest in Europe. While senior-level Romanian-American military contacts were preserved well into the late 1980s, an impressive capability and golden opportunity had been squandered and critical channels of communications broken, leaving a plainly flummoxed Washington pondering the degree of Romanian self-destructiveness.100 Ironically, the destruction of military intelligence partly caused by his defection added plausibility to Pacepafs allegations that Romania was gheading East,h i.e. towards Moscow.
Having already completely strangled independent foreign ministry reporting to Ceau.escu, the quashing of the militaryfs global intelligence network reduced the Romanian leaderfs regular intelligence sources to one, the foreign intelligence branch (now CIE) of the DSS. With the disappearance of foreign ministry and military intelligence reporting, there was no way to double-check or control the information and analyses provided by the perennially troubled CIE, where even Party oversight was historically poor or non-existent. The regime was now at the mercy of its only remaining means for discerning friend from foe and avoiding fundamental threats to the security and existence of the state. Meanwhile, hostile powers could now concentrate their active measures and influence operations against a much smaller target. Controlling the information reaching the Romanian leader was now a question of controlling only a handful of people.

The Pacepa Myth

The Carter Administration apparently made every effort to shield the Romanian-American relationship against fall-out from the United Statesf unexpected acquisition of Pacepa. Acccording to a Stasi report, for example, a US Colonel asserted that gthe President of the United States has decided that this issue must be treated with much delicacy, in order not to affect the good relations between the USA and SRR,h an approach confirmed by the Stasifs West German and Polish sources as well.101 Just as it caused consternation in the US, Pacepafs defection also caused confusion among the Romanian leadership, especially since initial inquiries indicated that the defectorfs dependencies lay in the East, not in the West.
For example, it was discovered that Pacepafs father was a translator (for Romanian and Hungarian) and intimate of the head of Soviet occupation forces in Romania at the end of the war, General Rodion Malinovsky. It was also discovered that Soviet intelligence . which wholly controlled the Romanian interior ministry at the time . generously provided for Pacepafs university education during the Stalinist years (1948-1951) to the extent of permitting him a new car as a student at the height of the class struggle against the ereactionaryf bourgeoisie. DSS investigations likewise uncovered the close relationships that he maintained with Soviet intelligence advisors throughout his career (and of which he would later boast), long after such relationships were expressly forbidden in 1963.
As noted, the same day that Pacepa left Romania for the last time, and only one day before he defected with his tale of a Romanian Trojan horse faithfully responding to the tug of Soviet reins, Kremlin boss Leonid Brezhnev bewailed Ceau.escufs etreasonousf collaboration with the Americans and Chinese in a much more honest exposition to East German Party boss Erich Honecker. The Kremlin chief complained to Honecker that the Sino-Soviet rapprochement (facilitated by the Romanians) was a grapprochement on an anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis,h and that Washington and Beijing continued to employ gthe differentiated approachh towards Eastern Europe gto bring them into confrontation with the Soviet Union.h102 To these ends, the exasperated Soviet leader continued, the Americans and Chinese gactivelyh exploited the gspecial courseh of Nicolae Ceau.escu, whose behavior defied description and whose next moves only gthe devilh knew.103
Directly contradicted by Brezhnev, and rejected after subsequent verification by US intelligence agencies (although not by all intelligence officers within them), Pacepafs tale conformed exactly to Soviet active measures designed to isolate the Romanian leader and his country from their American partners. Meanwhile, further proof was piling up that what Pacepa was telling the Americans had nothing to do with what was really going on between Romania and the Soviet Union. A few weeks after Pacepafs arrival in the US, for example, Brezhnev again complained in confidential discussion with Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov that Romanian policy opposed gthat of the rest of the Warsaw Pact countriesh and undermined their security. In particular, Ceau.escufs attempts to create ga regional Balkan state cooperation organization,h the Kremlin boss warned, were designed to gundermine Soviet authority and influence on the Balkans and create instead dissonance in Soviet-Bulgarian relations.h104

Brezhnev reminded Zhivkov of their continuing collaboration against the Romanians, underscoring that:

“…with their policy regarding Balkan cooperation the Romanians create diplomatic complications for Bulgaria. When they make a fuss over the question of the establishment of a Balkan cooperation, they do not do this merely as a whim. The issue of regional cooperation development in the Balkans is seen by the Romanians, as well as by the Yugoslavs and the Greeks, as a way to decrease the influence of the Warsaw Pact states in the region. This is the essence of their approachc We should decisively counteract all the projects for the creation of an autonomous Balkan group with its own particular interest”.105

Concurrently, the RCP leader publicly addressed a series of contentious foreign and security policy issues including, in the most explicit formulation to date, Soviet and Pact operations to replace his regime. Less than a week after Pacepafs defection, Ceau.escu denounced ga number of reactionary imperialist circlesh that were employing gespionage and subversion,h recruiting grenegades and declasse elementsh from among the population, and using gall possible kinds of propaganda to slanderh certain socialist countries.106 The formulation was general enough to be taken as an attack on the United States, especially given the symbolic meaning of gimperialismh and gimperialisth in Marxist-Leninist discourse.
However, it bears emphasis that Bucharestfs gimperialistsh were not those of Moscow, as Ceau.escu had taken the pains to point to the US administration on more than one occasion.107 In Romanian usage the appellation gimperialisth usually referred to Moscow and Budapest, in conformity with Romaniafs own historical experience with the Tsarist, Soviet, Hapsburg and Austro-Hungarian Empires, all of which . unlike the United States . had predatory designs on Romanian territories and populations. Underscoring its lack of antagonism towards US intentions, Bucharest even lobbied a reluctant Washington to become involved in the Balkan Pact project.108
Pacepafs main allegations were not deemed credible by responsible German authorities or by the Carter Administration, which consigned them to well-deserved ignominy. However, Pacepa did manage to win over some of the same circles that were drawn to Golitsynfs now demonstrably false conspiratorial theories regarding Romaniafs emythicalf independence and the efakef Sino-Soviet rift. These circles were professionally (and sometimes ideologically) pre-disposed to believe in the Communist gmonster plot,h whereby any observable intra-Communist friction was interpreted as intentional Soviet artifice designed to deceive the West.109
The great irony was that Moscow did indeed stage intra-alliance disputes to deceive the West, many of which can now be identified by comparing public declarations and press articles with the newly available documented proceedings of Warsaw Pact meetings. However, those same documents reveal that Soviet alliance gshadow-boxingh did not involve Romania. As it turns out, the only allegedly efakef conflict within the Warsaw Pact singled out by both Pacepa and Golitsyn . the Soviet-Romanian clash . was also the only genuine conflict of long duration within the Soviet alliance. Unfortunately, Pacepafs claims and allegations were given new life during the electoral campaign that led to Carterfs defeat in November 1980 such that they skewed and distorted US perceptions of Romania to an astounding degree during the 1980-1992 administrations of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Sr.
From the earliest days of the Reagan Administration it became apparent that Pacepafs disinformation had gdamaged bilateral relationsh between Washington and Bucharest.110 His impact was evident among academics specializing on Romania in the US and Europe, some of whom later described the Ceau.escu regime as having deceived the West with a faux independence from the Soviet Union that was never serious enough to provoke an open clash with Moscow.111 More seriously, and aided by the ever-productive active measures campaign coordinated by the Kremlin, Pacepa was able to convince members of the administration that Romania ran hostile operations against the US, and that Washington should rupture, or at least greatly reduce and restrict, relations with it.112 Ironically, if there was any gmythh about Romanian independence it resided in the fact that gindependenceh was far too weak a term for describing policies that were so overtly and consistently hostile to basic Soviet aims.

NOTES
1 Exposition on Discussions with Cde. V. I. Potapov, Chief of the Romanian Sector of the CPSU CC Section, 27 July 1978, Document No. 2 in Watts (2012a), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-29-the-soviet-romanian-clash-over-history-identity-and-dominion.
2 Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea, USSR, 25 July 1978, Document 8, ”U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980 . New Russian & East German Documents”, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 8/9 (Winter 1996), p. 123, CWIHP.
3 Jordan Baev, ”The eCrimean Meetingsf of the Warsaw Pact Countriesf Leaders”, in Jordan Baev and Anna Locher, ”Brezhnev’s Crimea Meetings in the 1970s”, 14 August 2003, PHP, p. 4.
4 BStU, MfS, Abt. X 22, S. 3-56; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), pp. 316-330.
5 BStU, MfS, ZAIG 7120, S. 288; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 338.
6 Conspect of Conversations with Cde. V. I. Potapov, Head of Romania Sector of CPSU CC Section, 16 May 1979, Document No. 4 in Watts (2012a), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-29-the-soviet-romanian-clash-over-history-identity-and-dominion
7 See also Pacepa (1987), pp. 8-9. This allegation also appeared on the book jacket.
8 Op. cit., pp. 41, 46. See e.g. Telegram 3630 From the Department of Defense Attache at the Embassy in Romania to the Department of the Army: gRomanian Request For U.S. Military Technology And Equipment (C),h Bucharest, July 30, 1975, 1638Z, Document 35 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969.1976, Volume E.15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973.1976.
9 See e.g. Pacepa (1987), pp. 25, 32-37, 57-58; Le Matin, 4 February 1985.
10 Interview with former FBI special agent Wayne Barnes in Andrei Badin, ”Dezvaluirile unui superagent FBI” [Disclosures of an FBI Superagent], Jurnal National, July 29 2008. Pacepa also lobbied against the re-extension of MFN to Romania after December 1989. While every other Soviet ally received it almost immediately with the fall of Communism, Romania, arguably more in need of economic assistance than any other Pact member, was denied access to US markets and credits in the first three years of its transition as its ultimate disposition and frontiers remained a matter of international contention.
11 Badin (2008). Former FBI agent Barnesf public praise for Pacepa’s Red Horizons as ”decent, impersonal and objective” is by no means universally shared, even among Pacepa’s partisans. See Barnesf interview in Badin (2008). Barnes, seconded by Vladimir Tismaneanu, expressed similar praise for Pacepafs, Programmed to Kill: Lee Harvey Oswald, the Soviet KGB, and the Kennedy Assassination (2007), affirming that Pacepa gexquisitely reveals the truth . with verifiable, consistent, meshing-together, and incontrovertible facts.h The blurbs of Barnes and Tismaneanu appeared on the original Ivan Dees publicity flyer and, along with other blurbs from Pacepa supporters, can be accessed at https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781566637619. In contrast, CIA reviewer Hayden Peake found the defectorfs tale so improbable, so lacking in supporting evidence, and so filled with supposition that he gives a health warning to its readers. Quoting R.V. Jones, the reviewer notes that: ”No set of mutually inconsistent observations can exist for which some human intellect cannot conceive a coherent explanation, however complicated”. Hayden B. Peake, ”The Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf”, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 88-89, CIA.gov.
12 Andrzej Paczkowski, ”Civilian Intelligence in Communist Poland, 1945-1989: An Attempt At a General Outline”, InterMarium (Columbia University East Central European Center), vol. 10, no. 1 (2007), pp. 2-3, accessible at www.sipa.columbia.edu.
13 See e.g. Raija Oikari, gOn the Border of Propaganda and What Can Be Saidh in Ansii Halmesvirta, editor, Bridge Building and Political Cultures: Hungary and Finland 1956-1989, Hungarologische Beitrage, vol. 18, Jyvaskyla, Finland, University of Jyvaskyla, 2006, pp. 299-356; MOL M-KS-288-22cs.-1971-43.o.e., pp. 117-133. Symbolic of this approach was the appointment of Reformed Bishop Janos Peter, identified as a Soviet agent when working as a propagandist in the Soviet front World Peace Council under the Rakosi regime, as foreign minister in 1963. Budapest continued to use gdiplomacy as a vehicle for aggressive foreign intelligence operationsh throughout the 1970s. Rudolf L. T.kes, Hungaryfs Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession, 1957-1990, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 231. For Peterfs defense of the Soviet repression in 1956 see Investigation of Communist Takeover and Occupation of Hungary. Fifth Interim Report of Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Hungary of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, Under authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438, Hungaryh, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954, www.archive.org; Statement made by the Right Reverend Janos Peter, Bishop of the Hungarian Reformed Church and member of the World Council of Peace on behalf of the Hungarian Peace Committee, 18 November 1956; Former Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy to US State Department officials, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 10, 1964, Document 105, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Vol. XVII, Eastern Europe.
14 Oikari in Halmesvirta (2006), pp. 299-356.
15 See e.g. Pacepafs interview on the Hungarian television station created to reach ethnic Hungarian populations in the neighboring states, gConfessions of a Spy Chief,h DUNA TV, Budapest, 24 February 2004a, 0100 hrs; Agentie de presa RADOR [RADOR Press Agency] (Bucharest), 24 February 2004. See also Ioan Talpes, In umbra marele Hidalgo [In the Shadow of the Great Hidalgo], Bucharest, Vivaldi, 2009, pp. 92-94. Then Romanian Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) Director Ioan Talpes confirmed this in an interview with the author, 10 October 1996.
16 See e.g., Ion Mihai Pacepa, ”Russia Hid Saddam’s WMDs,” Washington Times, 2 October 2003, and Pacepa’s remarks in Jamie Glazov, ”Symposium: KGB Resurrection (Continued)“, 30 April 2004c; and Jamie Glazov, ”From Russia With Terror”, 1 March 2004b at www.frontpage.com. See also Pacepa on DUNA TV (2004a); RADOR (2004). Pacepa may have underestimated the length of his service with the KGB since the Soviet-run state security had provided for his 1948-1951 university education as well.
17 Informational Report Regarding the Desertion of Lt. General Mihai Ion Pacepa (Socialist Republic of Romania) and His Refuge in the U.S.A. (hereafter: Report on Pacepa Desertion), 12 September 1978, BStU, MfS, Abt. X 22, S. 3-56; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), pp. 330-331; gDie Enthullungen des Rumanen Pacepa . Der Phantom Spion von Bonnh [The Defection of the Romanian Pacepa . The Phantom Spy From Bonn], Der Spiegel, nr. 36, 4 September 1978. The Stasi noted that the CIA considered him of somewhat greater value for his general knowledge of gleadership circles of the Warsaw Pact.h
18 Report on Pacepa Desertion (1978), BStU, MfS, Abt. X 22, S. 3-56; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 333.
19 In discussions with former senior officers of the DSS (Securitate) the latter make a clear differentiation between Doicaru, Pacepa, Caraman and Iosif, whom they consider Soviet (or other Warsaw Pact service) gmolesh or gtraitors,h and Stanescu, regarding whom they give generally positive assessments. Barring evidence to the contrary, this author is prepared to accept such interpretations. However, Stanescu had administrative responsibility for the DSS when these dysfunctions were occurring.
20 Ironically, for all of its corruption, the Romanian Securitate was probably somewhat less corrupt than other services in the Warsaw Pact owing to the fact that it did not have access to the massive amounts of money available to the other members as a result of their participation in the Soviet-sponsored narcotics trafficking to undermine Western society. Such activities earned a reported $92 million for GDR leader Erich Honecker personally. ”Western Intelligence Links Honecker to Drugs”, Bild (Hamburg), in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-EEU-89-233, 6 December 1989, p. 40. The much earlier involvement of Polish intelligence in private companies led to a number of intra-service corruption scandals involving highly-placed Party leaders already in 1962. See e.g. Paczkowski (2007), footnote 38. Likewise, the Bulgarian KDS was suspected of siphoning gmillions of dollars from state fundsh through its 395 foreign trade companies gspread from Austria to Singapore.h See e.g. ”Bulgarian Studies Bogus Companies”, The New York Times, 19 January 1992.
21 Liviu Taranu, editor, Ion Mihai Pacepa In Dosarele Securit..ii 1978-1980 [Ion Mihai Pacepa in the Securitate Files 1978-1980], Consiliul National Pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securitatii [National Council for the Study of Securitate Archives], Bucharest, Editura Enciclopedic., 2009, pp. 32-33, 223-225, 264; Liviu Taranu, gAfacerea Peregriniih [The Peregrine Affair], in Constantin Mo.incat and Dan Poinar, coordinators, Pietre de hotar (Oradea), vol. 6, Editura Tipo MC, 2007, pp. 221-229; Ionel Gal, Ra.iune .i represiune in Ministerul de Intern, 1965-1989 [Rationales and Repressions in the Interior Ministry, 1965-1989], Ia.i, Editura Do-minoR, 2001-2002, vol. I-II, pp. 135-136. Gal was the Securitatefs archivist.
22 Arhiva Serviciul Roman de Informatii [Romanian Intelligence Service Archive: ASRI], fond D, dosar 11200, vol. 35, f. 309-316; Mihai Pelin, Culisele spionajului romanesc: DIE 1955-1980 [Behind the Scenes of Romanian Espionage: DIE 1955-1980], Bucharest, Evenimentul Romanesc, 1997, p. 304; ..ranu (2009), p. 33; Liviu Taranu, ”I. M. Pacepa, ultimele zile in DGIE” [I. M. Pacepa, The Last Days in the DGIE], Magazin istoric, no. 3/480, (March 2007), pp. 15-20.
23 For Pacepafs defamatory claim that Romania had sent more than 500 agents into the Islamic world in order to foster virulent anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, see Ion Mihai Pacepa, gRussian Footprints: What does Moscow have to do with the recent war in Lebanon?h National Review, 24 August 2006. For Israeli debunking of such claims see e.g. Yosef Govrin, Israeli-Romanian Relations at the End of the Ceausescu Era, New York, Routledge, 2002, and Aba Effen, Israel At A Crossroads, Jerusalem, Gefen, 2001.
24 See e.g. Govrin (2002), pp. 254-255, 335-337. The fact that Ambassador Govrin had been chief of the Israeli Foreign Ministry department that dealt with Easter Europe from the late 1970s until 1985, then served as Israeli ambassador to Romania during 1985-1989 before returning to Tel Aviv as his ministryfs secretary general lends particular authority to his assessments on Romanian policy in the Middle East. See Gefen (2001), pp. 170-176, 183.
25 A post-1989 investigation by US authorities discovered that the only significant theft was a commercial one. Stolen vehicle windshield technology was used in the manufacture of Romanian cars. Investigators uncovered no evidence that Bucharest had stolen any US military technology.
26 For example, Polish intelligence had been organized for Science and Technology (S&T) acquisition by their Soviet masters since 1954. In 1958 the Gomu.ka regime established a Committee for Scientific-Technical Cooperation with Abroad expressly to aid this effort. Paczkowski (2007), p. 6. While Pacepa was making his scurrilous accusations of Romanian technology theft, Polish intelligence officer Marian Zacharski was busily stealing US plans for gthe ePatriotf missile, the eStealthf aircraft system, and the ePhoenixf missile, and the submarine sonar system.h Ibid, p. 8; Witold Bere. and Jerzy Skoczylas, General Kiszczak mowi..prawie wszystko [General Kiszczak TellscAlmost All], Warszawa, BGW, 1991, p. 188.
27 Pacepa (1987), pp. 8-9, 16, 41 and 46. Milt Bearden, the former CIA division chief responsible for the USSR and Eastern Europe, delivered one of the harshest, albeit indirect, retorts to Pacepafs claim, noting that Ceau.escu ghated the Soviet Unionfs guts.h Bearden and Risen (2003), p. 391. One might note that the Romanian leader was reciprocating the sentiment shared by Kremlin leaders towards his country.
28 Among those persuaded by the Pacepa gTrojan horseh tale were former US Ambassador to Romania, David Funderburk; the analyst Judith Geran Pilon; and journalist (and former advisor to White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig) Michael Ledeen.
See e.g. The Washington Post, 15 May 1985; Funderburk (1987), pp. 32-34, 42-48; Pilon (1985), pp. 1-2, 11-12; and Michael Ledeen with I. M. Pacepa, gRomania Reaps Rewards of Hi-Tech Thefts,h Human Events, 16 March 1985.
29 See also Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army, New York, Berkeley Books, 1982, pp. 7-8
30 The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services (u): Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (NI IIM 82-10002), DCI, 1 June 1982 (declassified 19 November 1999), p. 22, CIA. This memo was prepared under auspices of the National Intelligence Council with the CIA, FBI, NSA, DIA, the Deputy Chief of Intelligencefs (DCI) Community Counterintelligence Staff, and intelligence components of the Departments of State, Energy, Commerce and Treasury, Air Force, Army, Navy, and Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury, and was approved by the DCIfs Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. See also Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, April 1982, Exhibit 1. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, May 1982, especially the testimony of 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12 May 1982.
31 National Security Decision Directive 54: United States Policy Toward Eastern Europe, 2 September 1982, The White House (Declassified 15 May 2006), p. 3, CIA.
32 Hostile Intelligence Threat . U.S. Technology, Office of the Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security), Department of Defense, DoD 5200.1 .PH-2, November 1988, pp. 5-6. See also Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of the United States Counter-intelligence and Security Programs, report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1986; and A Report on Foreign Espionage in the United States, United States Department of State, March 1987.
33 The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services (1982), pp. 18, 22, CIA.
34 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus, Cambridge, Ballinger, 1986, p. 218.
35 US Army captain Zoltan Szabo, a Hungarian-born naturalized citizen, was gfounderh and gmastermindh of gthe Conrad spy ring in Europe.h He worked with two Hungarian doctors based in Sweden gto move NATO secrets to the Hungarian intelligence service,h which then sent them on to Moscow. See Herbig and Wiskoff (2002), pp. 11, 28-29, 49, 58. Szabo recruited Clyde Lee Conrad in 1974 when the two were sergeants stationed at a classified documents deposit in Germany. The Szabo-Conrad ring operated throughout the 1970s and 1980s as gone of the biggest spy rings since World War II.h Ibid. On the Szabo-Conrad spy ring see also Colonel Stuart A. Herrington, Traitors Among US: Inside the Spy Catcherfs World, Novato, CA, Presidio, 1999; and Danny L. Williams, Damian and Mongoose: How a U.S. Army Counterespionage Agent Infiltrated an International Spy Ring, Tuscon, Wheatmark, 2011.
36 The ring included US Sgt. Roderick James Ramsay, Jeffrey Rondeau, Jeffrey Gregory, Tommaso Mortati, Kelly Warren, and Hungarian nationals Imre and Sandor Kercsik. Richelson (1986), p. 218; J. Gerth, gEx-U.S. Sergeantfs Spy Case Is Said To Grow In Seriousness,h The New York Times, 10 March 1989. Szabo never served a day in prison as the Austrian court gave him a suspended sentence. Conrad received a life sentence from a West German court in 1990.
37 The Technology Acquisition Efforts of the Soviet Intelligence Services (1982), p. 23, CIA.
38 Katherine L. Herbig and Martin F. Wiskoff, Espionage Against The United States By American Citizens 1947-2001, Monterrey, CA, Defense Personnel Security Research Center, July 2002, Appendix A, pp. A3-A8. Zacharski, convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1981, was traded four years later for g25 Western agents held in Soviet and East European prisons.h See e.g. Benjamin B. Fischer, gThe Vilification and Vindication of Colonel Kuklinski,h Studies in Intelligence, no. 9 (Summer 2000), www.cia.gov. In August 1994 the Polish government appointed Zacharski head of the Polish security intelligence but reconsidered in the face of international scandal, during which Washington pointed out that he was still under a life sentence in the US. Ibid; Fred Ikle, ”How To Ruin NATO”, The New York Times, 11 January 1995; John Pomfret, gPoles Ponder Patriotism After Spyfs Appointment, Firing,h The Washington Post, 3 September 1994.
39 This was made evident in 1968, when Hungarian intelligence on events in Czechoslovakia proved far superior to Soviet intelligence despite the latterfs networks and officers embedded in Czechoslovak security organs. See e.g. Joseph Dresen, gFilling in the Blanks for the Prague Spring,h gPrague Spring, Prague Autumn: Filling in the Blank Spots from 1968,h 23 February 1999, Event Summary, Events List, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/filling-the-blanks-for-the-prague-spring.
40 Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update, September 1985, p. 15-16, CIA. See also Hostile Intelligence Threat . U.S. Technology (1988), pp. 5-6
41 Herbig and Wiskoff (2002), Appendix A, pp. A3-A8
42 Op. cit., p. 62.
43 Pacepa (1987), pp. 115-127, 368-372.
44 Communist Aid to the Third World Oil Industries (ER RP 73-12), 1 June 1973, pp. 1-3 and 19, CIA; Intelligence Report: Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1974 (ER IR 75-16), 1 June 1975, p. 2-3, CIA.
45 gCoordination and instruments for direction of Soviet and East European aid programs within and outside CEMA [CMEA]h in Relationship Between Soviet and East European Economic Aid Programs in LDCs (SOVA), 26 September 1975, pp. 1-3, CIA.
46 Unfortunately, this legacy was jettisoned after 1989 and ignored by the European Union, which has had to greinvent the wheelh regarding its policy towards the developing world. See e.g. Mirela Oprea, Mandatory Ignorance: Development Discourse in Romania from Socialism to EU Membership, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Bologna, Italy, 2009 at http://amsdottorato.cib.unibo.it/2228/.
47 Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas (NIE), 1 October 1979, pp. 21-22, CIA.
48 See e.g., op. cit., Table 6: gEast European Military Assistance to Third World Countries, 1955-1977,h p. 21. For Bulgaria, for example, see Jordan Baev, gEast-East Arms Trade: Bulgarian Arms Delivery to Third World Countries, 1950-1989,h 18 September 2006, gGlobal Cold War,h PHP.
49 See e.g. Minutes of the meeting between Todor Zhivkov and Fidel Castro in Sofia, 11 March 1976, CSA, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 60, File 194, in gBulgaria and the Cold War,h CWIHP.
50 Documents 2-5 in Watts (2012a) at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/e-dossier-no-29-the-soviet-romanian-clash-over-history-identity-and-dominion.
51 See e.g. Ion Mihai Pacepa, gWho Is Raul Castro? A tyrant only a brother could love,h National Review August 10, 2006.
52 Soviet and East European Economic Assistance Programs in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1982 and 1983: A Research Paper, CIA Office of Global Issues coordinated with Department of State, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Agency for International Development (GI 84-10182), 1 November 1984, p. 5, CIA.
53 See e.g. Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, New York, HarperCollins, 2007, p. 547.
54 Heuer (1999), pp. 124-125. As Heuer notes, erroneous impressions tend to become part of a ghindsight biash and incorporated into new analyses. Op. cit., pp. 161-163.
55 Op. cit., pp. 124-125.
56 Harriman served as US Ambassador to Moscow and then directed the Marshall Plan before working with Bucharest in the early 1960s, when Lyndon B. Johnson first requested Romanian mediation assistance. Harriman gconducted the sensitive negotiations that brought about the sensitive 1962 Geneva accords on Laosh and then headed the negotiating team during the Paris Peace Talks in 1968. gAverell Harriman: The Toughest Test,h Time, 10 May 1968; Interview with Gaston Marin by Lavinia Betea, gDe la Kremlin spre Vest si Casa Albah [From the Kremlin to the West and the White House], Jurnalul National, 6 March, 2007.
57 See e.g. Barnes and Bodnaras (1974), Pacepa (1987), p. 63.
58 Reagan (2007), p. 547. Jesse Helms, fully embracing Pacepafs claims, accused Ambassador Barnes of gnot being sufficiently anticommunisth elsewhere as well. See e.g. Bruce W. Jentleson, gAmerican Diplomacy: Around the World and Along Pennsylvania Avenueh in Thomas E. Mann, editor, A Question of Balance: The President, The Congress, and Foreign Policy, Washington D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1990, p. 176; Shirley Christian, gHelms, In Chile, Denounces U.S. Envoy,h New York Times, 14 July 1986; Bernard Gwertzman, gWashington Backs U.S. Envoy On Chile Funeral,h New York Times, 15 July 1986.
59 US Secretary of State Dean Rusk was similarly well-informed and supportive of the U.S.-Romanian relationship. Interestingly, he is taken to task for alleged naivete in trusting Bucharest in a recent study alleging that Romanian mediation attempts in Vietnam were entirely false and undertaken only in order to obtain US nuclear secrets for covert weapons programs. R. Eliza Gheorghe, gRomaniafs Nuclear Negotiations Postures in the 1960s: Client, Maverick, and International Peace Mediator,h Romania Energy Center (Bucharest), 2012, pp. 20-22, 25, 31-32. See the discussion of Romaniafs alleged covert nuclear weapons program in Chapter 16 of this volume.
60 David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, Guildford, CT, Lyons Press, 2003, pp. 202, 207. The CIA investigation of Harriman code-name Operation DINOSAUR fell apart because Golisynfs allegations were so insubstantial that CIA Director Richard Helms refused Angletonfs insistent demands that he inform the President. Harriman had been Ambassador to the USSR during World War II and to Great Britain after the war, Director of the Marshal Plan in Europe, Governor of New York, both an Assistant Secretary and Under Secretary of State, US Secretary of Commerce, and Special Presidential Envoy.
61 W. Averell Harriman, gGratitude for Romaniansh in ”Letters To The Editor”  The Washington Post, 12 September 1972. The Pentagon Papers excerpts to which Harriman took exception appeared in the Postfs 27 June 1972 issue.
62 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive And The Secret History Of The KGB, New York, Basic Books, 2001, pp. 210-211. The KGB unsuccessfully sought to recruit a host of unlikely candidates with influence over US policy, for example, Carterfs National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. Op. cit., p. 212. Brzezinski was also an advocate of close US engagement with Romania.
63 In another context, a former SIE director described how this author was targeted by similar active measures while working on Romaniafs NATO integration and on police reform issues during the 1990s. According to the former SIE director, the agent, working out of a Hungarian intelligence front ”non-governmental’ organization in the city of Arad, propagated disinformation themes through an asset then holding an internship in the US Embassy in Bucharest claiming that this author was ”pro-Fascist and anti-Semitic”. See Lucia Jurca, moderator, ”Intilniri capitale” [Capital Meetings], Radio Roman. Bucharest, 4 July 2012, 2100 hrs.
64 After the Cold War, while working on NATO integration issues in Bucharest, the author and two colleagues seconded from the British Ministry of Defense were persistently harassed in relatively harmless ways (door locks professionally picked and left open, night laser-sighting through windows, etc.), apparently with the aim of conveying the image that Romanian institutional interests were hostile to military reform and NATO membership. When later informed of these actions, Romanian officials were incensed that they had not been informed of these transgressions at the time, which would have allowed them both to pursue the transgressors and to eliminate any doubts regarding their orientation and operational behavior. In their view, the most probable perpetrators were external, not internal.
65 Pelin (1997), pp. 98-99.
66 Pacepa (1987), p. 195. As Pacepafs testimony had specific disinformation purposes it must be treated with caution. In this instance, for example, he asserts that Militaru was activated by the Soviet gmilitary attache with whom he had been to academy in Moscow,h and that Militaru was caught handing the attache a phonebook. East European officers did not attend classes together with Soviet GRU officers unless they were GRU officers themselves. Militaru stated after the collapse of Communism that he had been seeking GRU assistance, including weapons, to get rid of Ceau.escu. Pacepa similarly minimized General .erbfs earlier treason in 1991, claiming that .erb had passed information to the Soviet military attache on the defense of Bucharest against a NATO conventional attack, purportedly for the latterfs doctoral dissertation. In contrast, .erb confessed to betraying his countryfs defensive plans against a Soviet-led invasion, including the strengths, deployments, personnel files of the commanders of the principal units designated for defensive operations against Soviet invasion. In both cases Pacepa defined away any Soviet threat to the country or its leadership. See Ibid and Pelin (1997).
67 Militaru was discovered plotting with General Ion Ioni.. in 1984, and again with General Marin Pancea, General Nicolae Pletos, Captain Nicolae Radu and Virgil Magureanu in 1987-1988. He later admitted conspiring with the GRU. Ioni.., Pancea, Pletos, and Radu were all dismissed or sidelined for inappropriate contacts with GRU officers. Magureanu was a gperson of interesth for Romaniafs anti-KGB unit because of alleged Soviet ties. Deletant (1995), pp. 92-93, 283. See also the television interview with Magureanu and former SIE Director Ioan Talpe. on Realitatea TV (Bucharest), 21 August 2008, 2258 hrs.
68 Doicaru was first identified as a Soviet agent in the DSS inquiry following Pacepafs defection in 1978. The same inquiry concluded that Caraman, Iosif and Pacepa were Soviet agents. In 1988 Doicaru was caught in flagrante while in a clandestine meeting with a GRU handler. Transcript no. 111 of 12 June 1994 (continuation of hearing of Lieutenant General Victor Neculicioiu) in Arhiva Senatului Romaniei, Bucharest, p. 11; Alex Mihai Stoenescu, Istoria loviturilor de stat in Romania [The History of Coup dfEtats in Romania], Bucharest, Rao, 2005, volume 4, part II, p. 128. The Romanian Senate Hearings, were never made available to the general public. As this volume was going to press, the first report coordinated by Senator Sergiu Niculescu was leaked to the media and is now posted (in the original Romanian) as Raport Privind Ac.iunile Desf..urate In Revolu.ia Din Decembrie 1989 (I) [Report on The Actions Undertaken During the December 1989 Revolution (Part I)] at http://www.ziaristionline.ro/2013/01/29/ce-ascundea-sergiu-nicolaescu-sub-presul-revolutiei-un-ofiter-de-informatii-rupe-tacerea-raport-privind-actiunile-desfasurate-in-revolutia-din-decembrie-1989-i/.
69 Doicaru was reassigned to the ministry of tourism.
70 Doicaru was replaced by Alexandru D.nescu.
71 Ion Stanescu had been replaced by Emil Bobu in 1973 and, two years later, Bobu was replaced by Teodor Coman. Coman lost his post in the midst of the Militaru and Pacepa scandals.
72 Teodor Coman held the post of interior minister along with that of DSS chief during 1975-1978. When Postelnicu was named DSS chief, George Homo.tean took over as interior minister.
73 Dossier Regarding the Problems Resulting from the Materials Referring to Colonel Constantin Iosif, Minister of Interior, DSS, 22 June 1979, Top Secret in ASRI, Fond D, dosar 11200, vol. 2, f. 51-52; Pelin, (1997), p. 279. The dossier notes that Iosif undertook the destruction of documents with Colonel Teodor Dorobon.u and Major Sp.taru gsecretly, behind closed doors,h without following standard operating procedures or obtaining necessary authorizations.
74 Pelin (1997), p. 207.
75 Ibid.
76 D.nescufs replacement was Romulus Dima.
77 BStU, MfS, Abt. X 22, S. 3-56; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 319. Herbstritt and Olaru did not print the officerfs name, noting only his rank (Major General). Pacepafs intimate in the gPeregrine Affairh had been Major General Eugen Luchian. Luchian was convicted, sentenced and served eight years in Aiud Prison. Caraman also held major general rank and continued to be influential in Romania at the time the Herbstritt and Olaru volume was published, as security counselor to a former Romanian prime minister. Doicaru remained at the ministry of tourism until he was caught in the middle of a clandestine meeting with his Soviet handler in Bucharestfs Herastr.u Park in 1988.
78 The problem was much larger than the DIE since DSS officers regularly transferred between foreign intelligence and domestic security posts; a frequent practice among Soviet Bloc services.
79 See e.g. the interviews in John Sweeney, The Life and Evil Times of Nicolae Ceau.escu, London, Hutchinson, 1991, pp. 124-125.
80 Ple.i.a was no simple bodyguard. He headed the Security and Guard Directorate (Direc.iei de Securitate .i Garda) of the DSS.
81 Report of Major General Neagu Cosma About the Disorganization within the DGIE and the Working Methods of the Two Chiefs: Nicolae Doicaru and Ion Mihai Pacepa, 15 September 1978, Document 107 in ..ranu (2009), pp. 202-203; ACNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar nr. 3447, vol. 6, f. 218-228.
82 The orders put in place in 1973 by Doicaru, Pacepa and Caraman subordinated foreign counterintelligence to the DIE leadership and gpractically annihilated any possibility to control the activity of the foreign intelligence organs abroad.h The most important being order no. 000235/73. CNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar nr. 3447, vol. 1, f. 269-290; Overview of Principal Conclusions Drawn Up by the Commission of Inquiry Resulting from Investigations of the Context That Favored the Defection of General Ion Mihai Pacepa, Document no. 131, ..ranu (2009), p. 425.
83 See Nicolae Ple.i.afs interview with Viorel Patrichi from Lumea Libera in Oprea and Patrichi (2004), pp. 20-21.
84 Ibid.
85 The inquiry, which heard over 500 officers and issued more than 2,500 reports, exposed numerous operations executed gwithout the approval of Party organsh and identified Pacepa and Doicaru as responsible for subverting the DSS mission abroad, gproliferating corruptionh within the DSS and among the senior Party and state leadership, gcompromisingh Romanian foreign policy, and gcontributing to the degradation of Romaniafs foreign imageh over more than a decade. ..ranu (2009), p. 29.
86 The nature of the measures undertaken in the wake of Pacepafs defection is still hotly contested by officers of the Securitate serving at the time. For example, the punitive measures taken against personnel by both Dima and Postelnicu, as well as their appointment of party workers in positions that should have been filled with intelligence professionals, is deemed a major cause of the defection wave of 1978-1984 by some former officers. Romanian use of the KGB gcollegiumsh model, in which the security organs operated under a collective leadership, lent further plausibility to Ple.i.afs claims of influence. As head of one branch of
95
the Securitate . that dealing with the protection of state and party institutions and the guarding of Party leaders . his word would have carried considerable weight in state security councils.
87 Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, New York, Doubleday, 2007, p. 417. The windfall was provided by the head of Cuban intelligence in Czechoslovakia to the CIA station chief in Vienna.
88 Although accorded every protocol and taken for a tour of the building and its operations during her unannounced weekend visit to the Center, Elena Ceau.escu was offended by the failure to order everyone to drop what they were doing, gather in the auditorium, and present her a formal report on the Centerfs work, which would have required orders from military superiors. The trumped-up nature of the incident suggested that Elena was searching for excuses to close it down.
89 Unlike the rest of the Pact, Romania did away with the institution of career gpolitical officersh operating as Party watchdogs over the military. See the discussion of the transformation of Romaniafs Main Political Administration into the Higher Political Council, and its impact on officer career paths and orientations in chapter 8 of this volume.
90 Interview with General Ioan Talpe., 15 May 2002.
91 Former US Ambassador to Romania Roger Kirk and former Romanian diplomat Mircea R.ceanu note that by 1985 Elena Ceauescu overtly viewed the United States as hostile and fervently sought to eradicate gAmerican influence over her husband and the Romanian people.h Roger Kirk and Mircea R.ceanu, Romania vs. the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd 1985-1989, Washington D.C., Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1994, p. 59. Ceau.escufs efforts to salvage and improve U.S.-Romanian ties in the mid- and late-1980s were thus directly contradicted by those of his wife and her entourage, making the apparent schizophrenia of the regime very real indeed.
92 The DIE-DIM struggle, in which the DIE sought a monopoly control over all foreign reporting and intelligence gathering that would virtually shut down military intelligence operations abroad, is described in Watts (2010), pp. 555-556.
93 Ion Dohotaru, coordinator., Directia Informatii Militare: Intre fic.iune .i adev.r [The Military Intelligence Directorate: Between Fiction and Reality], Bucharest, 1994, p. 148.
94 Supplementary Annex to the Material gOperative review survey of the R.S.R.,h 27 September 1978, BStU, MfS, HA II 18663, S. 223-226; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 337. Nothing of this has been published on the US side, where US military intelligence is among the most closely guarded. The Stasi further reported that it did gnot possess informationh confirming whether General Dumitrufs planned meeting with General Thompson took place. General Thompson was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the U.S. Army during 27 April 1977-1 November 1981.
95 Dohotaru (1994), pp. 148-149. Pelin makes the unlikely claim that Pacepa, among others, had supported DIM chief General Dumitrufs original appointment in 1963, thus tainting Dumitru 15 years later. In 1963 the DSS had little influence in the army and Pacepa was in charge of technological espionage in Germany. Officially, Dumitru was sacked for having an affair with one of his female operatives, a move rendered plausible only because of the turf war over the service waged by Elena Ceau.escu. His hold on the post had already been shaken by the treason of General Militaru that March, despite the fact that the DSS, rather than military intelligence, was responsible for counterintelligence in the army.
96 Receiving intelligence about preparations for demonstrations on the eve of the revolution, Dinu elected to go on vacation. For Dinufs version of events see Rear Admiral (ret.) .tefan Dinu, Condamnat la disre.ie [Condemned to Discretion], Bucharest, Neverland, 2009.
97 Dohotaru (1994), p. 150. The DIE was assisted in this by Military Security (in fact DSS Department IV), which targeted Romanian officers. Department IV officers in the land forces were gmilitaryh largely by dint of their co-location in the ministry of national defense and their uniforms, most never having done military service in the army. In the much more highly technical air force, however, Department IV had to recruit from among air force personnel, for example, the pilots, to be effective, and thus had a correspondingly greater level of sophistication.
98 See e.g. Catherine Lovatt, gWomen in Politics: The Legacy of Elena Ceau.escu,h Central Europe Review (Bucharest), vol. 1, no. 3 (12 July 1999); Cornelia Les, gThe Emergence of Elena Ceau.escufs Cult,h Journal of the International Students of the History Association (Budapest), vol. 36, no. 3 (2001).
99 Dohotaru (1994), pp. 238-239.
100 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Vessey Jr., visited Bucharest in the spring of 1985. Romania was the only Communist country ever visited by a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Cold War. In 1986 the Romanian Chief of the General Staff, General Constantin Olteanu, reciprocated with a visit to the Pentagon at General Vesseyfs invitation. (Olteanufs predecessor, General Ion Coman, had visited the US in 1975 and 1976.) In February 1988 a senior military delegation from the US Strategic Defense Initiative visited Bucharest to brief the Romanians on SDI (gStar Warsh). Romania was the only Pact member to receive such a briefing. The gclosely cooperatingh partners attacked SDI as an aggressive measure.
101 Report on Pacepa Desertion (1978), BStU, MfS, Abt. X 22, S. 3-56; Herbstritt and Olaru (2005), p. 317. Emphasis in original.
102 Report on the Meeting Between SED General Secretary E. Honecker and L.I. Brezhnev in the Crimea, 25 July 1978, Document 8 in gU.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980 . New Russian & East German Documents,h Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 8/9, (Winter 1996), p. 123, CWIHP.
103 Ibid.
104 Information on Conversation of the Secretary General of the CC CPSU (Leonid I. Brezhnev) with the Bulgarian Head of State (Todor Zhivkov) in Crimea, 14 August 1978, pp. 8-10, 15-17; CSA, Sofia, Fond 378-B, File 495, and BCP Politburo Resolution and Information on the Conversation of the Bulgarian Head of State (Todor Zhivkov) with the Secretary General of the CC CPSU (Leonid I. Brezhnev) in Crimea, 9 August 1981, CSA, Sofia, Fond 1-B, Record 67, File 405, pp. 13-14, both in Baev and Locher (2003), PHP.
105 Baev, gThe Crimean Meeting of the Warsaw Pactfs Countriesf Leaders,h p. 4, in Baev and Locher (2003), PHP
96
106 Patrick Moore, gHua Kuo-Feng in Romania,h RAD Background Report/187, 24 August 1978a, OSA, Box 116, Folder 8, Report 24, p. 4.
107 The Romanians first employed gimperialisth as a descriptor of Soviet behavior during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. See e.g. Record of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia, 21 August 1968, ANIC, fond CC al PCR/Cancelarie, dosar nr. 133/1968, ff. 6-26. See also Retegan (2000), pp. 211-225. In 1975 Ceau.escu reassured President Gerald Ford that there was gno reason for you to be angered when people start talking in an anti-imperialist way since these are questions of broader applicability.h Memorandum of Conversation, Bucharest, August 2, 1975, 7-8:10 p.m., Document 36, Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973-1976, U.S. Department of Statement. Henry Kissinger notes Ceau.escufs emphasis on the fact that the US was not the first state Romanians thought of when they employed the term gimperialist.h Kissinger (2000), p. 662.
108 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 21, 1973, 11:50 a.m.-12:40 p.m., Document 26 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969.1976, Volume E.15, Part 1, Documents on Eastern Europe, 1973.1976, pp. 5-6
109 Pacepafs influential partisans included FBI special agent Wayne A. Barnes; journalist and former advisor to White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, Michael Ledeen; long-time Newsweek journalist and editor Arnaud de Bourchgrave; Heritage Foundation analyst Juliana Pilon; political scientist Vladimir Tismaneanu; Radio Free Europe journalist Nestor Ratesh; former dissident writer Dorin Tudoran; and journalists Sorin Rosca Stanescu and Dan Pavel. See e.g. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781566637619.
110 Daniel N. Nelson, gEastern Europe and the Non-Communist Worldh in Stephen Fischer-Galati, editor, Eastern Europe in the 1980s, Boulder, Westview, 1981, p. 216.
111 See e.g., Tismaneanu (2003), pp. 187-188; Tom Gallagher, Theft of a Nation: Romania Since Communism, London, Hurst & Co, 2005, pp. 158-159; Tom Gallagher, Outcast Europe: The Balkans 1789-1989: From the Ottomans to Milosevic, Amsterdam, Harwood Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 237-241.
112 Funderburk (1987), especially chapter three, gRomanian Foreign Policy: The Myth of Independence,h pp. 39-54; Reagan (2007), pp. 547-548.

Reproducerea este incurajata, cu citarea surselor:

Larry L Watts via Ziaristi Online

Foto: Pacepa.ro

CEI DINTAI VOR FI CEI DIN URMA

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS…1
AUTHOR’S PREFACE…8
I MISAPPREHENDING ROMANIA…10
CH. 1: MISAPPREHENDING ROMANIA… 11
Romania as Analytical Problem: A Legacy of Misapprehension… 13
The Underlying Cognitive Bias: Romania as eLeast Ablef to Defy Moscow…16
Supporting Fallacies: Never Questioning Membership in the Warsaw Pact… 22
Supporting Fallacies: The Covert Opposition of Other Pact Members… 25
Organizational Pathologies, The Cuban Missile Crisis and Enemy-Imaging… 30
Secrecy, Compartmentalization and the Vietnam War… 33
Deception and Disinformation: Intolerance and Cultural Genocide… 39
Deception and Disinformation: Romania as Soviet Trojan Horse… 43
Soviet Entanglement Operations… 48
The Alarming Trend of Romanian-American Relations… 52
II THE CLASH OF 1978… 77
CH. 2: THE PACEPA DEFECTION… 78
Casting Romania as the ”Prince of Thieves”… 78
Alleging Soviet Agency, Discrediting Romaniafs Friends… 82
The DSS in Disarray… 84
Dismantling Romanian Military Intelligence… 87
The Pacepa Myth… 90
CH. 3: CLANDESTINE CONFLICT GOES PUBLIC… 100
The Clash over International Terrorism… 101
Perceiving and Besieging the Beijing-Bucharest Axis…103
Battling the Kremlinfs eWar Hysteriaf at the 1978 Warsaw Pact Summit… 109
Preparing for Soviet Countermeasures… 115
The Resort to Transparency… 117
Exposing the Lines of Intra-Pact Subordination… 122
III ACTIVE MEASURES AT THE END OF THE 1970S… 137
CH. 4: THE PATTERN OF HOSTILE BLOC OPERATIONS… 138
Wrestling with Conspiracy… 139
Operating along Hidden Lines of East-West Influence… 141
Oblique Approaches to the Romanian eTraitorf… 143
Re-Interpreting Basket III from eEast-Westf to eEast-Eastf … 146
Isolating the Moldavian SSR from Romanian Subversion… 147
Conspiracies External and Internal 1977-1979… 149
Manufacturing Minority Abuse… 153
The Romanian Challenge to Bloc Unity… 155
Scenarios of Intervention: Instability, Ethnic Conflict & Secession…159
Alleging Abuse as Justification for Redrawing Borders… 162
CH. 5: SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN… 177
Stealing Afghanistan… 177
Concealing Extraordinary Protest… 180
Winding Down the Belgrade-Bucharest eAlliancef… 182
Mobilizing Soviet Loyalists in Favor of the Invasion…184
The Campaign Against Pakistan… 186
IV DENIGRATING DEFENSE POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS… 195
CH. 6 REWRITING ROLES IN THE POLISH CRISIS… 196
eExploiting Contradictionsf between Poland and Romania… 196
Antagonism over Warsaw Pact Integration… 199
Soviet Active Measures and the Principle of Non-Intervention… 202
Romanian Opposition to Intervention in Poland in 1980… 206
Stalking Romania at the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Meeting December 1981… 208
Burying Romanian Defiance… 211
CH. 7: DISCREDITING THE ROMANIAN ARMY… 222
The Romanian-American Special Relationship prior to 1980… 222
Parsing the Autonomy of the Romanian Armed Forces: The Alexiev RAND Studies…226
Denigrating and Obscuring Military Policy and Behavior: The Volgyes Study… 230
The Enemy-Imaging of the Romanian Armed Forces…234
The Impact of the Volgyes Study… 236
CH. 8: TARGETING THE MILITARYfS eTHINK TANKh… 250
The Battle over Military History… 252
Get Ilie: The Assault on the Center for Military History and Theory… 255
Soviet Influence Over Regime Access to Information… 257
Perceiving Romanian Availability for Soviet Offensive Operations… 259
Hurdles to U.S. Assessment at the Beginning of the 1980s… 262
V HI-JACKING ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY 1982-1984… 273
CH. 9: BLOC POLICY TOWARDS ROMANIA UNDER ANDROPOV… 274
Soviet Manipulation of the Subservient Warsaw Pact Leaders… 275
Holding Romania Back, Pushing Hungary Forward… 276
Misrepresenting Romaniafs Balkan Policy… 279
Hungarian Personalities and Institutions… 282
Hungarian Precedence in Soviet Front Organizations… 283
Misrepresenting Romanian Behavior and Intent… 287
Romania Adrift… 288
Turning Up the Operational eHeatf on Romania… 290
CH. 10: THE EUROMISSILE CRISIS AND HUNGARIAN eINDEPENDENCEf… 300
Denying RYAN… 300
Romania, Hungary and the Policy of Differentiation… 304
Building Up Hungary, Tearing Down Romania … 307
The 1983 Intelligence Offensive… 309
Foreign Policy Outreach, Paranoia, and the Decline of Administrative Capability… 311
The Reality and Perception of Hungarian eDissidencef… 313
Behind the Curtain of the Euromissile Crisis… 316
The Sz.ros Initiatives and the Media Dispute over Euromissiles… 319
Romanian Roots of Hungaryfs eNewf Foreign Policy… 323
Overt Opposition and Covert Collusion… 324
VI TRANSFORMING COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE… 337
CH. 11: SECURITY TRANSFORMATION AS SURVIVAL… 338
Romanian Strategies for Combating Soviet Military Control…339
Enemy-imaging of the US and NATO… 340
Influencing Soviet Strategy through the Warsaw Pact… 343
Romanian Advocacy of CBMs and Mandatory Verification… 346
Soviet and Pact Views of the Romanian Position on CBMs… 349
Institutionalizing the CSCE… 351
Protecting the CSCE Process in Madrid… 354
CH. 12: EXTORTING AN END TO THE COLD WAR… 362
Imminent Threat & Alliance Discipline versus Disarmament… 362
eWar Scaref versus Reason at the 1983 PCC Meeting… 364
Transitioning to Disarmament, Pact Reform & the Special Commission… 366
A eClass-Indifferent, Destructive and Extortionist Attitudef… 368
Creating the Virtual Conversation on INF… 370
An Anniversary Not Worth Celebrating … 374
Leveraging Warsaw Pact Renewal, January 1985 … 378
The eTransition to Disarmament Initiativef Re-Loaded, March 1985 … 381
Romanian Military Conditions for Signing a New Warsaw Pact… 385
CH. 13: LESSER ARTISTS BORROW, GREAT ARTISTS STEAL … 395
Romanian Arms Control Expertise and Gorbachevfs Security Agenda … 396
Coming Around to eNew Thinkingf … 397
Gorbachevfs Military Problem … 398
Reclaiming the Soviet Security Agenda … 400
The Head-to-Head Clash between Romania and the Soviet Military … 401
Keeping Up the Pressure on Moscow: The 1985 Sofia Summit … 402
The Foreign Ministers Meeting and Reykjavik Summit of 1986 … 406
At the May 1987 Summit… 408
Whose Defense Policy?… 410
Suppressing the Romanian Role in INF … 413
VII WITH FRIENDS LIKE THESE, WHO NEEDS ENEMIES? 1988-1989 … 423
CH. 14: WARSAW PACT REFORM … 424
Transforming the Alliance: eIntegrationf vs. Democratization…424
The 1988 Reform Proposal: Dissolving the Warsaw Pact… 427
Spinning a Romanian Military Threat… 429
Soviet Fears of a Romanian Departure… 433
eAnti-Reformistf Romania: Liberation versus Liberalization… 436
Fears of Fascism and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact… 439
Misdirection, the Brezhnev Doctrine and Minority Rights… 441
The Three Levels of Soviet-Romanian Confrontation… 443
CH. 15: FROM PARTNER TO PARIAH… 454
Preparing the Terrain for Violence… 454
Hungary and the eAggressive Romanian Military Threatf … 457
The Romanian Nuclear Threat … 460
Ceausescufs eBombf … 461
Who is Preparing for Military Operations Against Whom?… 466
Communique of July 1989 Warsaw Pact Meeting in Bucharest … 469
Poland on the Aggressive Romanian Military Threat, August-December 1989… 471
Condemning Intervention and Demanding Troop Withdrawal: December 1989… 475
PAST AS PRELUDE . MISAPPREHENDING ROMANIA ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION … 493
INDEX ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 500

Abbreviations and Acronyms

5th Dept KGB FCD section for operations against NATO states (except for the U.S., UK and FRG), and against Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania
11th Dept KGB FCD section for cooperation with fraternal services
AAN Polish Archives of New Records (Archiwum Ackt Nowych)
ACSI Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army General Staff
ADIRI Romanian Association for International Law and International Relations
ADST Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training
AFCIN Air Force Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFP French Press Agency (Agence France Press)
AGERPRES Romanian Press Agency (Agen.ia Roman. de Pres.)
AGM/S Stasi Ministerfs Special Working Group (Arbeitsgruppe Des Ministers fur Staatsicherheit)
AMAE Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives
AMVR Bulgarian Archives of the Ministry of Interior (Arhiv Ministerstvo na Vtreshnite Raboti)
ANIC Romanian National Central Historical Archives (Arhivele Na.ionale de Istorie Central.)
AOSPM Archive of the Social-Political Organizations in Moldova (Arhiva Organiza.iilor Social-Politic din Moldova)
APN Novosti Press Agency
ARLUS Romanian-Soviet Friendship Society (Asocia.ia roman. pentru strangerea legaturilor cu Uniunea sovietic.)
ARTA Romanian Anti-Terrorism Unit prior to 1977
AS Academy of Sciences
ASB Bucharest State Archives (Arhivele de Stat Bucure.ti)
ASISRM Archive of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova
ASRI Archive of the Romanian Intelligence Service after 1989 (See SRI)
AVH Hungarian State Security after 1949 (Allamvedelmi Hatosag)
AVP RF Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (Arhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii)
AVP SSSR Foreign Policy Archive of the USSR (Arhiv Vneshnei Politiki SSSR)
BBC British Broadcasting System
BCP Bulgarian Communist Party
BfV West German Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fur Verfassunsschutz)
BM III Hungarian State Security (Main Administration III)
BM III/I Foreign Intelligence branch of Hungarian State Security
BNA British National Archives
BNE Bureau of National Estimates
BND West German Federal Intelligence Service (Bundes Nachrichten Dienst)
BPR Bulgarian Peoplefs Republic
BStU Office of the Federal Commissioner Preserving the Records of the Ministry of State Security of the former German Democratic Republic (Die Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik)
BTA Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (Bulgarsko Telegrafna Agentsiia)
C-in-C Commander in Chief
CAF Combined Armed Forces (Unified Armed Forces)
CBMs Confidence Building Measures
CC Central Committee
CDMFA Committee of Deputy Foreign Ministers
CDM Warsaw Pact Council/Committee of Defense Ministers
Ceteka CTK . Czech News Agency (.eska tiskova kancela.)
CFM Committee of Foreign Ministers (CMFA)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIE Romanian Foreign Intelligence Center 1978-1989 (Centrul de Informa.ii Externe)
CMD Committee of Defense Ministers
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CEMA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CHRR Committee for Human Rights in Rumania
CMFA Committee of Foreign Ministers
CNA Czechoslovak National Archives
CNCAN Romanian National Commission for Control of Nuclear Activities
CNSAS Romanian Post-Communist National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives (Consiliul Na.ional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securit..ii)
COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
COMCEN Communications Centre
COMECON Communist Economic Organization (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
COMINFORM Communist Information International
COMINTERN Communist International
COVSN Central Office for South Vietnam
CPC Soviet Front Christian Peace Conference
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPCz Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CPCS Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
CREST CIA Records Search Tool
CSA Bulgarian Central State Archives (Tsentralen Drzhaven Arhiv)
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSR Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
.SR Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CSS Romanian State Security 1968-1972 (Consiliul pentru securitate de stat)
CSSR Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
CTK Czech News Agency (.eska tiskova kancela.)
CWIHP Cold War International History Project
CzSR Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
DCM Deputy Chief of Mission
DDR German Democratic Republic
Directorate IV Romanian Military Security (a unit of the DSS)
DGFP Documents on German Foreign Policy
DGSE French Foreign Intelligence since 1982 (Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieure)
DGIE Romanian Foreign Intelligence 1951-1965 (Directoratul General de Informatii Externe)
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Department of Defense
DIE Romanian Foreign Intelligence 1965-1978 (Direc.ia de Informa.ii Externe)
DIM Romanian Military Intelligence (Direc.ia Informa.ii Militare)
DMCS British Defense Ministryfs Directorate of Management and Consultancy Services
DNI Director Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy
DOD Department of Defense
DOSAAF Soviet Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, and Fleet
DPPA Soviet Department for Political Propaganda Abroad (also known as Department for Counterpropaganda and Department of International Information), which operated during 1978-1986
DSS Romanian Department for State Security (Departamentul Securit..ii Statului)
DST French Counterintelligence (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire)
EEC European Economic Community
EER East Europe Report
EEU East Europe
EMGE Hungarian Agricultural Society of Transylvania (Erdelyi Magyar Gazdasagi Egyesulet)
EME Transylvanian Museum Society (Erdelyi Muzeum Egyesulet)
ETH Swiss Technological College
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCD KGB First Chief Directorate
FCO British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLO Foreign Liaison Officer
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola)
FO British Foreign Office
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GDR German Democratic Republic
GPO Government Printing Office
GRC Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan)
GRU Soviet Military Intelligence (Glavnoe Razvedyvatelnoe Upravlenie)
GSG 9 German Anti-Terrorist Unit (Grenzschutzgruppe 9)
H. Res. House Resolution
HA Main Department of East German Stasi (Hauptabteilung)
HAR Hungarian Autonomous Region
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HHRA Hungarian Human Rights Association
HPC Higher Political Council
HPD Higher Political Directorate
HPR Hungarian Peoplefs Republic
HPU Hungarian Popular Union/Peoplefs Alliance
HSWP Hungarian Communist Party after 1948 (Hungarian Socialist Workers Party)
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVA East German Main Reconnaissance Administration (Hauptverwaltung Aufklarung)
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IIM Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
IMEMO Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations (Instituta Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnikh Otnoshenii)
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INTERKIT China International (Internal Deliberations on China)
IPN Polish Institute of National Memory
IRA Irish Republican Army
IREX International Research and Exchanges Board
ISIS Institute for Science and International Security
ISPAIM Romanian Defense Ministryfs Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History (Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Ap.rare .i Istorie Militara)
IUS Soviet Front International Union of Students
JPRS Joint Publications Research Service
KAL Korean Air Lines
KC PZPR Central Committee, Polish United Workerfs Party Central Committee (Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej)
KDPR Korean Democratic Peoplefs Republic (North Korea)
KDS Bulgarian Committee for State Security (Komitet za Drzhavna Sigornost)
KGB Soviet Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti)
KKI Hungarian Institute of Cultural Relations (Kulturalis Kapcsolatok Intezete)
KOMSOMOL Soviet Communist Youth League (officially, All-Union Leninist Young Communist League)
KUM Hungarian Foreign Ministry (Kulugyminiszterium)
LDCs Less-Developed Countries
LWF Lutheran World Federation
LYA Lithuanian Special Archives (Lietuvos ypatingasis archyvas)
MAE Romanian Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Arhiva Ministerul Afacerilor Externe)
MApN Archives of the Ministry of National Defense (Arhiva Ministerul Ap.rare Na.ional), former designation of Romanian Military Archives
MBB Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm
MBFR Mutually Balanced Force Reductions
MCP Moldavian Communist Party
MECW Marx and Engels Collected Works
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN Most Favored Nation
MfS East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit)
MGB Soviet State Security 1946-1953 (Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti)
MIA Missing in Action
MLF Multilateral Nuclear Force in Europe
MOD Ministry of Defense
MOL Hungarian State Archives (Magyar Orszagos Levetlar)
MOSSAD Israeli Intelligence Service
MPA Main Political Administration
MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola)
MTI Hungarian Telegraphic Agency (Magyar Tavirati Iroda)
MVSZ Hungarian World Federation (Magyarok Vilagszovetsege)
MSSR Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
MSzMP Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart)
NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC Nuclear-Biological-Chemical
NDC National Defense Council
NEM New Economic Mechanism
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIC National Intelligence Council
NID National Intelligence Daily
NIDC National Intelligence Daily Cable
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NIO National Intelligence Officer
NKVD Soviet State Security under Stalin (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del)
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA National Security Agency (when referencing persons, National Security Advisor)
NSAEBB National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
NSC National Security Council
NSDD National Security Decision Directive
NSWP Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
OCB Operations Coordinating Board
OCI Office of Current Intelligence
ONE Office of National Estimates
OPLANS Operational Plans
OPR Office of Political and Regional Analysis
OSA Open Society Fund
OSS U.S. Office of Strategic Services
OTAN NATO
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PCC Political Consultative Committee (Leading Body of the Warsaw Pact)
PCF French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Francais)
PCR Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Roman)
PER Project on Ethnic Relations
PHP Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (formerly, Parallel History Project for NATO and the Warsaw Pact)
PLA Chinese Peoplefs Liberation Army
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Politburo Political Bureau
POW Prisoner of War
PPR Polish Peoplefs Republic
P-R Scenario Main Polish-Romanian Threat Perceived by Soviet Military Leaders 1919-1936
PRC Peoplefs Republic of China
PREM Premierfs Office
PRH Peoplefs Republic of Hungary
PRO Public Records Office, British National Archive
PWUP Polish Workers Unity Party (PZRP)
PZRP Polish Workers Unity Party (Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej)
RADOR Press Agency of Romanian Broadcast Society (Societatea Roman. de Radiodifizune)
RCP Romanian Communist Party
RFE Radio Free Europe
RFER Radio Free Europe Research
RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFSI Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
RG Record Group
RGANI Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii)
RGASPI Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsialfnoi i Politicheskoi Istorii)
RMA Romanian Military Archives (Formerly, Archives of the Ministry of National Defense (Arhiva Ministerul Ap.rare Na.ional))
RRG Romanian Research Group
RSFY Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
RPR Romanian Peoplefs Republic
RSR Romanian Socialist Republic
RSSM Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
RUMNO Bulgarian Military Intelligence (Razuznavatelno Upravleniye na Ministerstvoto)
RWP Romanian Workers Party
RYAN Nuclear Missile Attack (Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie)
S&T Science and Technology Section
SACUER Supreme Allied Command Europe
SB Polish State Security (S.u.ba Bespiecze.stwa)
SDI U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (Also known as gStar Warsh)
SdM Stasi Ministerfs Secretariat (Sekretariat des Ministers)
S/E Division CIA Division for the Soviet Union and East Europe
Securitate Romanian Department for State Security (Departamentul Securit..ii Statului)
SED East German Party of Socialist Unity (Sozialistiche Einheits Partid)
Service A Soviet Active Measures Service 1962-1991 (Sluzhba Aktivnykh Meropriyatiyl)
SHIN BET Israeli Counterintelligence (also known by acronym SHABAK)
SIE Romanian Post-1989 Foreign Intelligence Service (Serviciul de Informa.ii Externe)
SNIE Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOFAs Status of Forces Agreements
SOVA CIA Office of Soviet Analysis
SOVROM Soviet-Romanian Joint Company
Spetsnaz GRU Special Purposes Units (Voyska spetsialnovo naznacheniya)
SRI Romanian Post-1989 Counterintelligence Service (Serviciul Roman de Informa.ii)
SRR Socialist Republic of Romania
SSR Soviet Socialist Republic
SSSR Soviet Union
Stasi East German State Security (Staatssicherheit)
StB Czechoslovak State Security (Statni bezpe.nost)
SVR Russian Post-Communist Foreign Intelligence Service (Sluzhba vneshnei razvedki)
TASS Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (Tyelyegrafnoye agyentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza)
TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic (type of nuclear reactor provided to Romania by the United States under the gAtoms for Peaceh program)
TsKhSD Russian Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation until 1999, now RGANI
UAF Unified Armed Forces, Warsaw Pact
UAR United Arab Republic
UM Romanian Military Unit designation (Unitate Militar.)
UM 0110 Romanian Anti-KGB Unit 1978-24 January 1990
UM 0544 Romanian Unit designation for foreign intelligence
UM 0920/A Romanian Anti-KGB Unit 1965-1978
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF United Nations Childrenfs Fund
URSS Soviet Union
USIA United States Information Agency
USLA Romanian Anti-Terrorist Unit since 1977 (Unitatea Speciala pentru Lupta Anti-Terorista)
UTC Romanian Communist Youth Organization (Uniunea Tineretului Communist)
USG U.S. Government
USSR Soviet Union
UWCS Unified Wartime Command System
VOA Voice of America, Official U.S. Radio
VOKS All-Union Association for Cultural Relations Abroad 1925-1958 (Vsesoiuznoe obschestvo kulfturnikh svyzei s zagranitsei). In 1958 replaced by Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.
VPK Soviet Military . Industrial Commission (Voenno-Promyshlennaya Kommissiya)
VRYAN Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack (Vnezapnoye Raketno-Yadernoe Napadenie)
WARC World Alliance of Reformed Churches
WCC World Council of Churches
WFDY Soviet Front World Federation of Democratic Youth
WFTU Soviet Front World Federation of Trade Unions
WMD Weapon of Mass Destruction
WP Warsaw Pact
WPC Soviet Front World Peace Council
WSI Polish Military Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1990-2006 (Wojskowe S.u.by Informacyjne)
WSW Polish Military Counterintelligence until 1990 (Wojskowa S.u.ba Wewn.trzna)
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)
WWC Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
ZAIG Stasi Central Analytical and Information Group (Zentrale Aufwertungs und Informationsgruppe)

Reproducerea este incurajata, cu citarea surselor:

Larry L Watts via Ziaristi Online

Foto: Pacepa.ro

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1 comment

  1. adim

    cu scuzele de rigoare, fiindca las un mesaj care nu are legatura cu subiectul articolului…poate intr-o zi o sa stati de vorba cu un specialist cinstit si ne spuneti, mai pe indelete, cam ce consecinte poate avea, pe termen mediu si lung, disparitia celui mai mare zacamant de aur din Romania. Desp[re otravirea cu cianuri, care e cel mai grav lucru, nici nu mai vorbesc.

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